Today the law says the patients in its beds. A hospital enters 340B on a count of inpatient days, and the money it then makes depends on outpatients the count never looks at. So an inpatient measure cannot, by itself, show that a growing outpatient drug business produces a safety-net benefit to match. Congress should require that relationship to be measured before it decides how eligibility should change.
Take one hospital. Richmond Community Hospital is a Bon Secours hospital in Richmond, Virginia, in a neighborhood the New York Times described as predominantly Black and low-income.1 Bon Secours says Medicaid patients account for 53% of the hospital’s inpatient admissions.2 The hospital takes part in 340B, a federal program that obliges drug makers to sell certain providers outpatient drugs at a discount.2,3 Attached to it is a network of outpatient infusion centers, specialty clinics and pharmacies, and that network is where its 340B money is made. From September 2018 to September 2023 the hospital reported $276.5 million in benefit from the program.2 The majority staff of the Senate health committee found that all of the savings on drugs that physicians administer came from the provider-based outpatient infusion centers, and none from the hospital itself. Bon Secours’s own letter says “substantially all”.2 The rest was pharmacy revenue, and Figure 1 gives the amounts. Bon Secours gave the committee its reason. Opening infusion centers “in a community with a more favorable payor mix,” it wrote, let the hospital stay in its own community. The savings, it said, “have allowed RCH to remain open, despite operating at a substantial loss for decades”.2
Its letter says the services at the hospital are provided “at a loss of more than $33 million annually”.2 The hospital’s list of child sites, it wrote, includes infusion centers, three oncology clinics, a gynecologic oncology clinic, a rheumatology clinic and a hepatology clinic.2 A 2022 Times investigation had described such sites as lying in wealthier parts of the city, by a trade publication’s summary.1 Bon Secours told the committee that the Times’s account of the infusion centers was “in every way inaccurate”.2 It says it complies with the program, and it told the Times it had provided nearly $18 million in free care to poor patients at the hospital since 2018.1 The record used here holds no finding against the hospital.
The case drew the attention of a Virginia senator at once. “I’m just worried the story is going to cause a lot of people to have really serious questions about a program that our safety net providers need,” Senator Tim Kaine said.4 He went on, “so Bon Secours needs to have an answer, and we are going to dig into it from the health committee standpoint”.4 The committee’s majority staff later examined the hospital, and its 2025 report is the source of the figures above.
None of this breaks a rule. A disproportionate share hospital qualifies for 340B by counting the Medicaid patients, and the Medicare patients on federal income support, who lie in its beds. An uninsured patient in one of those beds who is not eligible for Medicaid lowers its score. The hospital then earns the money on drugs given in its outpatient clinics and dispensed at pharmacies. Some of those outpatients are the same poor patients, and many may not be. The gate does not measure them either way.
A hospital advocate can accept every word of the Richmond account and call it the program succeeding. Money made on insured patients across town kept a hospital open in a poor neighborhood. That may be what happened. The trouble is that no rule asks anyone to show it, in Richmond or anywhere else. My conclusion is that 340B’s central accountability problem is the gap between qualifying for a financial benefit and demonstrating its public return. The program can sustain valuable services. It can also reward ownership, referral capture, and control of pharmacy transactions. These functions coexist. Eliminating a hospital’s margin does not automatically help patients if the money moves to a manufacturer, pharmacy intermediary, or payer.
I am sure of the diagnosis, because it is arithmetic. I am much less sure of the fix. The formula I suggest later is one option, and I can already see how it could go wrong.
I lead a radiation oncology department in a hospital, and I also take part in cancer and oncology leadership for the health system I work in. That system takes part in 340B. The opinions in this essay are my own and reflect my point of view, not that of the institutions I work for.
Richmond is one hospital, and its $276.5 million is a benefit, not a profit. The American Hospital Association, the AHA, says that “nearly 44% of 340B hospitals operated on a negative margin” in fiscal 2023.5 The evidence warrants scrutiny of the mechanism, not a presumption that every profitable prescription is improper.
Why Congress created an institutional subsidy
The program began as a repair. Medicaid’s drug rebate program, established in 1990, entitled Medicaid to a manufacturer’s best price. A deep discount to a clinic for the poor could therefore raise the rebate the manufacturer owed on every Medicaid sale. The 1992 House committee report described clinics and public hospitals losing their discounts, and it conceded that this was only one of many factors in pricing.6 Congress answered in the Veterans Health Care Act of 1992, which added section 340B to the Public Health Service Act.3
A manufacturer whose drugs Medicaid covers must offer covered outpatient drugs to listed providers, called covered entities, at or below a ceiling price.3 The ceiling starts from the drug’s average manufacturer price, or AMP, in the previous quarter. AMP is a statutory average of what wholesalers pay for drugs bound for retail pharmacies and what retail pharmacies pay when they buy direct.3,7 From it the formula subtracts the rebate the manufacturer would owe Medicaid on the same unit.8 For most brand-name drugs that rebate is at least 23.1% of AMP, and more when the drug’s price has outrun inflation.8 So 340B is not a fixed percentage discount from list price.
Covered entities include federally qualified health centers, Ryan White HIV clinics, other clinics that live on federal grants, and several kinds of hospital.3 The committee wrote that it intended “to enable these entities to stretch scarce Federal resources as far as possible, reaching more eligible patients and providing more comprehensive services”.6 The mechanism was institutional cross-subsidy. Lower the organization’s drug costs, and it can do more with its resources. It was not designed solely as a discount card handed to uninsured patients at a pharmacy counter. An insured patient’s prescription generating revenue for services used by someone else can therefore be consistent with the original rationale. The hard question is whether that second step happens, how much reaches it, and how it can be verified.
The program’s history is narrower than that reading. A 2026 history of the law was built from 175 internal documents and 19 interviews with 18 informants, and funded by the Commonwealth Fund. It notes that the “stretch” language “does not appear anywhere in the statute”.9 Its authors report that the drafters had in mind providers that depended on government grants and had a mission to give free and discounted drugs.9 What hospitals now do with commercially insured patients is lawful. By this account, the drafters never discussed it.
Nor was every later expansion an administrative accident. Congress deliberately added categories of eligible hospitals, including through the Affordable Care Act.3,10 The more defensible criticism is that the program’s commercial reach expanded faster than the ability to measure its resulting public benefit.
When a prescription qualifies for a safety-net discount, what additional benefit is the patient, or the community, guaranteed to receive? For much of hospital-based 340B, the answer is less specific than either side of the political argument suggests. The Congressional Budget Office, CBO, reports that the statute “does not set requirements for how participating facilities use 340B net revenues”.10 Ryan White clinics are an exception from outside the statute. Their grant rules treat 340B revenue as program income and list what it may pay for.11 So hospital findings cannot be generalized to every clinic.
A hospital collects more for a drug than it paid, and the gap between what the insurer and patient pay and the 340B price is the spread. The spread is not profit, because dispensing, nursing, fees and unpaid care come out of it. The companion essay follows one dose through that arithmetic under Medicare’s 2027 payment rule.
Three separate claims hide in any statement about the spread: money was generated, a particular organization retained it, and patients benefited because of it. Evidence for one does not establish the other two. Much of the 340B debate consists of answering the first question and presenting the answer as if it settled the third. The question before all three is which patients qualified the hospital.
The sums are large. Covered entities bought $100.0 billion of drugs at 340B prices in 2025, by the count of the Health Resources and Services Administration, HRSA, the agency that runs the program. Hospitals that qualify through the test described next bought $79.2 billion of that.12 The figures measure acquisition spending, not $100 billion of savings, profit, government outlays, or charity care.
The gate counts inpatient days
Most of the money comes through one category. A disproportionate share hospital, the category that bought the $79.2 billion, must pass three tests. It must be public, or a nonprofit with a government contract to serve low-income people. It must not buy outpatient drugs through a group purchasing organization. And on its latest Medicare cost report it must show an adjustment percentage “greater than 11.75 percent”.3,13 For-profit hospitals cannot join.13
That percentage is a statutory calculation, not a finding that 11.75% of its patients are uninsured or receive charity care. It comes from Medicare’s inpatient payment system, and it is built in two steps.
The first step adds two ratios of days spent in the hospital’s beds. One takes the days of Medicare patients who also receive Supplemental Security Income, or SSI, the federal cash benefit for the aged and disabled poor, and divides by all Medicare days. The other takes the days of patients eligible for Medicaid but not Medicare and divides by all patient days. Medicare’s own statement of it is “DSH Patient Percent = (Medicare SSI Days / Total Medicare Days) + (Medicaid, Non-Medicare Days / Total Patient Days)”.14 Only days in acute-care units count, and beds used for outpatient observation are left out.15
The two ratios have different denominators, so their sum is not the share of any group of patients. It is an index. No outpatient visit, infusion or prescription enters it. Medicare’s advisory commission, MedPAC, says so directly: “Outpatient sites affiliated with a hospital do not affect the hospital’s DSH adjustment percentage”.16 A hospital’s director of finance told a House subcommittee the same in 2017: “The DSH percentage is a representation of inpatient days”.17
An uninsured patient who is not eligible for Medicaid counts against the hospital. Her day enters only the denominator of the Medicaid ratio, so treating more such patients lowers the hospital’s score. The ratio turns on eligibility, not on who paid. An uninsured patient who was eligible for Medicaid that day counts in the numerator, if the hospital can prove it, and so do some patients covered through a state’s federal waiver. Patients paid for from a waiver’s pool for uncompensated care do not.15
An example shows the size of it, and its numbers are invented for the purpose. A hospital has 100,000 inpatient days a year. Medicare patients account for 40,000 of them, and 3,200 of those belong to patients on SSI, so the first ratio is 8%. Medicaid patients without Medicare account for 20,000 days, so the second ratio is 20%. The index is 28%.
Now the hospital admits more poor patients, enough to add 5,000 days. If they are on Medicaid, the second ratio becomes 25,000 ÷ 105,000, or 23.8%, and the index rises to 31.8%. If they are uninsured and not eligible for Medicaid, the ratio becomes 20,000 ÷ 105,000, or 19.0%, and the index falls to 27.0%. The patients are equally poor in both cases. Only their eligibility for Medicaid differs.
The second step turns the index into the adjustment percentage. For an urban hospital with 100 or more beds, the regulation sets the adjustment at 5.88% plus 82.5% of the amount by which the index exceeds 20.2%.15 Run that backward. An adjustment of 11.75% is 5.87 points above 5.88%, and 5.87 ÷ 0.825 is 7.1, so the index must exceed 20.2 + 7.1, or about 27.3%. The line that the statute writes as 11.75% is therefore a sum of two inpatient ratios above about 27.3%.
Return to the example hospital. At an index of 28% its adjustment is 5.88 + 0.825 × 7.8, or 12.3%, and it qualifies. With the uninsured patients its index is 27.0%, its adjustment is 11.5%, and it does not. With the Medicaid patients its adjustment is 15.5%. A hospital at the line that admits more uninsured patients, none of them eligible for Medicaid, can lose the discount for doing it.
Other hospitals qualify by other tests, and none of them looks at outpatients. Critical access hospitals, the small rural hospitals Medicare pays at cost, face no such percentage at all. Rural referral centers and sole community hospitals need 8%.3 Small urban and most rural hospitals have their adjustment capped at 12%, so for them the line sits just under the ceiling of the scale.15
Child sites qualify through the parent’s cost report
Once the parent hospital passes, its outpatient sites follow by an accounting test. HRSA asks whether an off-site clinic is listed as reimbursable on the hospital’s latest Medicare cost report, with outpatient costs and charges of its own.18 A clinic that meets the test registers as a child site. HRSA’s test does not ask whom the site serves.
A hearing record shows the sequence at one hospital. Northside Hospital’s director of finance told a House subcommittee in October 2017 that the hospital’s talks to acquire oncology practices began in 2011 and were completed in 2012.17 The locations operating as hospital outpatient departments were child sites, she said, registered in April 2014. Her explanation was that a large oncology practice had approached Northside “seeking integration with the hospital system, as were several other hospital systems in the Atlanta area,” for “clinically-integrated care”.17 Asked whether patients had been denied care since, she answered, “Since we acquired them, no”.17 The record establishes a sequence: acquisition, outpatient-department operation, registration, and hospital billing. It does not show why the hospital acquired the practices beyond its stated reason, whether any patient’s bill changed, or what the clinical effect was.
Nor does the program ask about the patient’s means. HRSA’s answer to whether patients outside Medicaid can receive 340B drugs is “Yes, as long as they are patients of the covered entity”.19 So a patient’s commercial insurance or relatively high income does not by itself disqualify the prescription. The limit is the care relationship. HRSA’s 1996 definition excludes a person “if the only health care service received by the individual from the covered entity is the dispensing of a drug or drugs”.20
Contract pharmacies widened the reach further. A contract pharmacy is an outside pharmacy that dispenses on a covered entity’s behalf. In 2010 HRSA allowed each entity an unlimited number of contract pharmacies, where its earlier guidance had allowed one.21 They grew from about 1,300 that year to nearly 20,000 in 2017.21
The pharmacy need not keep a separate shelf. In the common arrangement it fills the prescription from its ordinary stock at the ordinary price. Software later combs the filled prescriptions and patient records for eligible ones, and the entity orders 340B-priced drugs to replenish the stock.22 That description comes from a 2026 federal court order that relied on a drug maker’s declaration.
So the program’s growth is not the same as more medical treatment. CBO found that purchases through the program’s prime vendor rose from $6.6 billion in 2010 to $43.9 billion in 2021, in 2021 dollars. It judged the integration of hospitals with off-site clinics the largest of three program-specific causes, and it could not put numbers on them.10 In 2021, 87% of that spending was on drugs administered or distributed in hospital outpatient departments and their off-site clinics.10 A trade-press account of CBO’s figures puts off-site clinics in the program at about 6,100 in 2013 and 27,700 in 2021.23 An existing treatment can enter the 340B accounts when ownership, site registration, or prescription attribution changes.
One study of that growth comes with disclosures worth reading. A 2025 analysis covered more than 28,000 drug codes. It attributed an average of 79.6% of 2018–2024 growth at list prices to utilization, meaning more units, and close to all of it at 340B prices.24 The National Pharmaceutical Council, which describes itself as supported by leading biopharmaceutical companies, partly supported the study and reviewed the manuscript. IQVIA, which employs two of the three authors and owns the data, kept the final say on the text, and the data are not public.24,25 One of the three authors disclosed that he was an independent director of Kalderos, which, the disclosure says, “offers 340B solutions”.24
The appointment itself can carry the value, and some companies say so in their marketing. In 2021 the consultant Advis pitched hospitals a medication-management clinic, to which affiliated physician offices refer patients for a qualifying visit. The clinic, Advis wrote, could add “340B prescription revenue from patients that wouldn’t otherwise qualify for the Program”.26 Another company, CPS, markets “referral capture” to “retain escaping patients”.27 Both describe practice that the statute allows, as a federal court read it. That court struck down HRSA’s narrower patient definition as “contrary to the plain language” of the law.28
The hospital does not need the patient to become poorer, the medicine to become more effective, or the manufacturer to lower its ordinary price for the opportunity to change. An extra appointment might uncover an interaction, improve adherence, or coordinate care. It might also impose travel, time away from work, and another bill. Calling every qualifying visit a sham is unsupported. Treating a qualifying visit as evidence of clinical value is equally unsupported.
Payment rules decide where the margin is made
The spread on a prescription depends on who pays for it, and federal rules decide much of that.
Medicaid’s fee-for-service program, in which the state pays the claim itself, pays close to cost. Federal guidance since 2016 has told states to pay pharmacies their actual acquisition cost plus a dispensing fee. For 340B drugs, it says, “reimbursement should not exceed the 340B ceiling price”.29 On a Medicaid fee-for-service prescription the spread is close to nothing, by rule.
HRSA also keeps those patients out of contract pharmacies by default. A drug maker must not pay twice on one unit, once as a 340B discount and again as a Medicaid rebate. To prevent it, HRSA bars 340B drugs for Medicaid fee-for-service patients at contract pharmacies unless the pharmacy, the entity and the state agree on a method.30,31 The inspector general found in 2014 that most entities it studied, a purposive sample of 30, did not dispense 340B drugs to Medicaid patients there.32
Both rules are written for fee-for-service. Medicaid managed care, in which a private plan pays the claim, falls outside them, so Medicaid is not absent from the spread. An uninsured patient pays what she can, which is often little. In GAO’s sample of 55 entities, 30 reported giving low-income uninsured patients a discount at some or all of their contract pharmacies.21
So the gate does not measure the outpatient population on which the financial opportunity depends, and the payment rules pull the two apart. Medicaid’s fee-for-service program pays close to the 340B price by rule, and its patients are kept out of contract pharmacies by default. The patients the gate counts most, Medicaid patients, therefore produce less of the margin. MedPAC writes that the formula “is primarily driven by Medicaid patient shares”.33 The same person can still stand on both sides. A patient in a Medicaid managed-care plan counts toward the gate when she is admitted and can produce a spread when she fills a prescription.
Minnesota has published 340B revenue by payer. Its health department estimates that in 2024 commercial insurers produced about 45% of covered entities’ net 340B revenue, and Medicare about 36%. The state’s public programs, Medical Assistance and MinnesotaCare, produced about 19%.34 The figures are estimated, self-reported and unaudited, and they leave out self-pay and uninsured patients. They are also a share of revenue, a different kind of number from the gate’s index of days. They are set beside the index only to show direction. Maine now requires 340B hospitals to report by payer type as well, beginning July 1, 2026. Washington requires it where the data are available, under a law in force since June 11, 2026.35,36 Neither state’s payer figures are used here.
A study of cancer drugs shows the same dependence on the payer. Among Blue Cross Blue Shield patients at 1,541 hospitals from 2020 to 2024, the estimated prices hospitals paid for three biosimilars fell by 60%, 72% and 63%. What insurers paid fell by 32%, 36% and 34%.37 The gap between them, which the authors call the markup margin, grew as the drugs got cheaper. The acquisition prices were estimated from Medicare’s price files and never observed. The study’s funder is a foundation whose board includes representatives of Blue Cross plans, the payers of the markups it measures.37,38 The narrower lesson is valuable: lower-priced treatment and higher provider margin can occur together if acquisition prices fall faster than reimbursement.
This is also why “manufacturer-funded” does not mean “without consequences for taxpayers.” The mandated acquisition discount comes from the manufacturer. The reimbursement that turns it into a margin can come from Medicare, an employer-sponsored plan, and the patient.
11.75% was chosen to qualify particular hospitals
The line has a recorded origin, set out in the same 2026 history.9 One staffer recalled lowering it to 12.5% so the University of Virginia’s hospital would qualify. Senator Hatch’s condition was that the University of Utah’s hospital qualify too. So, “to accommodate Senator Hatch,” staff “found the new necessary minimum eligibility criterion: 11.75%”.9 The change added 91 hospitals and appeared only in the enrolled bill.9 That account rests on papers and memories from 1992. It shows how the number was chosen, not whether it is a good one.
Medicare has since moved its own money off this measure. MedPAC reported in 2015, citing its 2007 report, that the formula’s payments tracked uncompensated care poorly. The hospitals in the top tenth by uncompensated care provided 41% of it and received 10% of the payments.16 Since the Affordable Care Act, 75% of what Medicare would have paid in disproportionate share money goes into a separate pool for uncompensated care, reduced as the uninsured rate falls.14 MedPAC then designed a replacement index for Medicare’s own payments, and voted in 2023 to recommend it.33,39 The index has three parts. One is the share of a hospital’s Medicare claims, inpatient and outpatient, that are for low-income beneficiaries. The others are its uncompensated care as a share of revenue and, at half weight, Medicare’s share of its inpatient days.33 Its executive director said of 340B, by a trade publication’s account, “We are not touching it”.39 So Medicare now pays only a quarter of its disproportionate share money on the old index, while 340B still uses it for the whole decision, on $79.2 billion of purchases in 2025.
Hospitals near the line changed
The best evidence compares hospitals just above and just below 11.75%. Desai and McWilliams did so in Medicare claims. Eligibility was associated with 2.3 more hematologist-oncologists practicing in hospital-owned facilities, 230% more than expected.40 It was also associated with lower proportions of low-income patients in hematology-oncology, and with no more safety-net care.40 The design describes hospitals near the line, not every 340B hospital. The AHA replied that such hospitals are a “sliver” of the program and that the study used traditional Medicare data only.41
Hospitals also cluster at the line. In 2014–2016 the number of hospitals just above 11.75% rose 41% relative to those just below. Investor-owned hospitals, which cannot use the program, showed no such change.42 The authors list better record keeping, admitting more Medicaid patients and misreporting as possible causes. They put the share of hospitals that adjusted at “at most roughly 8%”.42
A 2026 study followed 122 hospitals that joined 340B in 2019 against 779 that did not, in traditional Medicare claims. Joining was followed by more total claims and more drug-administration claims at newly opened off-campus departments. The rise in drug claims themselves was not statistically significant, and the volumes were small.43
Several studies look at where new sites register. Clinics registered in 2004 or later served communities that were wealthier and better insured than those served by earlier registrants.44 Between 2010 and 2022 the neighborhoods of newly registered child sites and contract pharmacies became less deprived, while those of newly registered hospitals did not change.45 Another study, funded by Johnson & Johnson, found that child sites’ ZIP-code areas had a median income 28% above their parents’.46 These are studies of where new sites register, by neighborhood, not of whom they treat. The hospitals’ association replied to the first that its authors had not checked whether the clinics opened before or after their hospitals joined.47
None of the studies cited here compares a parent hospital’s patients with its own child sites’ patients. What exists is one documented hospital and neighborhood data.
Who benefits along the entire pipeline
Where the whole spread can be counted, the hospitals and clinics keep most of it. In Minnesota they reported $3.04 billion in payments for 340B drugs in 2024 and $1.53 billion to acquire them, a spread of $1.51 billion.34 They reported about $165 million in operating costs. About $137 million of that went to outside firms, $120 million to contract pharmacies and $17 million to other outside parties such as administrators, which is about 9% of the spread. The other $28 million or so was the entities’ own internal cost.34 They kept at least $1.34 billion in net 340B revenue, and large hospitals accounted for more than 80% of it.34 These are amounts the entities reported paying, so they are not a full measure of what intermediaries earn. The figures are self-reported and unaudited. The state calls the reimbursements for administered drugs likely inaccurate and the reporting of internal costs inconsistent, and it does not track how the net revenue was spent.34
Under current law a hospital may spend that money as it chooses. Cleveland Clinic told the committee that “there is no dollar-for-dollar ‘pass on’ requirement to patients under the 340B statute,” which is a correct statement of the law.2 Its 340B benefit was $933.7 million from April 2020 to June 2023. Of the $395.4 million in savings on physician-administered drugs, 44% came from pharmacies it owns at its child sites.2 It told the committee that the money reaches its income statement “without being independently segregated, distributed or allocated”.2 The 2025 staff report found that its financial-assistance policy did not cover dispensed drugs. Cleveland Clinic says it provides “extensive pharmacy-related benefits at minimal to no additional cost to patients or payers”.2 Bon Secours told the committee that “revenue is revenue, and all revenue is used to pay for expenses incurred in pursuit of our mission”.2
Between the drug maker and the hospital sits a layer of companies paid on each 340B transaction. A wholesaler settles the discount. A prime vendor collects a fee from suppliers on purchases under its contract. An administrator matches a prescription to a patient, and a pharmacy dispenses it.2,48,49 They supply real services: dispensing, patient counseling, inventory, claims matching, and compliance support. Few of them publish what 340B earns them.
Apexus has been the sole 340B prime vendor since 2004, under an HRSA contract. About nine in ten covered entities buy through it, by Senator Cassidy’s account.50 The government does not pay it. Drug makers and distributors pay Apexus a small percentage of sales, the New York Times reported.49 Senator Cassidy’s letter says the company generated $227 million in 2022.50 The Times, which the letter cites, reported that Apexus was on track for that figure.49 The company is private and its accounts are not public.49 Apexus says the program “is managed by” HRSA, “not by Apexus,” and that it “has no role in setting drug prices for patients or reimbursement for covered entities”.51 An inquiry identifies questions to investigate, not established wrongdoing.
Three wholesalers handle nearly all drug distribution, by PhRMA’s count, and in a 340B sale the wholesaler settles the discount by charging the difference back to the manufacturer.48 PhRMA, the drug makers’ trade group, concedes the larger point in its own report. “While the covered entity retains the largest share of the revenue, the wholesaler and the pharmacy also benefit financially from the 340B transaction,” it says.48 Cencora tells its investors that a rebate model “may also supplant 340B chargeback mechanisms that we administer, which could adversely affect our business”.52 McKesson owns Macro Helix, which by McKesson’s account serves about 40% of 340B hospitals.53 In 2025 McKesson also bought control of the business-services company of Florida Cancer Specialists, a practice that “remains independently owned”.54
Five companies, CVS, Walgreens, Express Scripts, OptumRx and Walmart, held three-quarters of 340B contract-pharmacy relationships, according to the Senate staff report, citing Drug Channels.2 CVS required hospitals and clinics to use its own administrator, Wellpartner, for the 340B drugs dispensed at CVS pharmacies. It told the committee that this “integrated approach” reduces “compliance problems,” and that hospitals remain free to use other pharmacies and administrators.2 In the contracts the committee examined, Wellpartner’s fee was the greater of $4 or 10% of the spread, rising to 14% in later contract years.2 A fee of that kind rises with the spread, which is what is paid for the drug, by insurer and patient together, less the 340B price. It does not follow the drug’s price as such.
By CVS’s own count, Wellpartner’s fees were $147 million in 2019, peaked at $386 million in 2021 and were $382 million in 2023, $1.6 billion over five years.2 That is revenue, not profit. CVS’s pharmacies also earn a dispensing fee, which CVS says compensates them for forgoing “payments from insurers”.2 CVS tells its shareholders that the arrangement matters to it. Fewer contract-pharmacy arrangements, less use of its administrative services, or less participation by drug makers, it writes, “could materially and adversely affect the Company”.55 Walgreens charged administrative fees of 8%, 13% and 20% in contracts the committee examined, on top of the dispensing fee, and did not report what its administrator earns.2 Walgreens says hospitals need not use its administrator and that its fees are fair market value.2 The committee’s report is the work of one party’s staff, and it is not an adjudicated finding.
A publicly filed contract shows how a percentage fee behaves. A 2021 agreement between a Florida AIDS service organization and a specialty pharmacy sets the pharmacy’s fee on insured claims at $17 plus 12% of total reimbursement.56 Applying that formula to a hypothetical $1,000 reimbursement produces $137 in pharmacy compensation. If acquisition cost were $600, the spread would be $400, and $263 would remain before administrator fees and other entity costs. Wellpartner’s formula, from a different arrangement, would take $40 of the same $400 spread in a first contract year and $56 at its later rate of 14%. The $1,000 and $600 are illustrative, and the fee formulas are documented. These are one historical contract and one company’s terms, not a national average or a finding of overcharging.
Some of these companies belong to larger groups. The three largest pharmacy benefit managers, PBMs, are vertically integrated with large insurers, the Federal Trade Commission’s staff found.57 Their groups also own pharmacies that act as 340B contract pharmacies, and two of them, CVS and Cigna, own administrators that match the claims.2,58 So one parent company can pay for a 340B prescription through its insurer or PBM, earn a fee on it at its pharmacy, and earn another as the administrator. Whether any group does is not shown. CVS told the committee that it keeps firewalls between its administrator, its PBM and its insurer.2 A gain in the pharmacy subsidiary is not automatically a saving for the employer, and nothing here shows what any group nets.
None of these sources has any of these companies directing the program. They draw less attention than hospitals and drug makers, and they say less about 340B in public. The legal recipient of the discount and the economic recipient of its value are not necessarily the same. Services, fees, negotiated prices, and ownership determine how that value is divided.
The lobbying is a fight over specific financial rights
The public record shows organized campaigns over the discount, the patient definition, contract pharmacies, and information. It does not reveal every meeting, establish that a senator adopted a position in exchange for money, or allocate every lobbying dollar to 340B.
Lobbying disclosure supplies scale, with an important limitation. PhRMA reported $7.04 million in federal lobbying for the third quarter of 2026, across every issue it works on. Its filing lists the SUSTAIN, ACCESS and SECURE bills and Senator Cassidy’s draft among them.59 For the same quarter the AHA reported $3.84 million across all issues, and 340B Health, the association of participating hospitals, reported $330,000 across all issues.60,61 None of these totals measures spending on 340B.
The hospitals ask to keep the gate where it is. The AHA’s letter went to Senator Bill Cassidy, the Louisiana Republican who chairs the Senate health committee. A site should qualify, the AHA wrote, if it “is part of the 340B hospital.” It should also meet Medicare’s provider-based standards and furnish “meaningful outpatient services to the hospital’s patients”.62 In October the AHA asked the sponsors of the SUSTAIN bill to “Remove Child Site Restrictions,” including a three-year wait for newly acquired sites.63
On patients, the AHA’s answer to Senator Cassidy’s draft was direct. It “respectfully reject[s] the premise that the current structure of the 340B program does not ensure direct patient benefit”.62 Every dollar saved, it wrote, benefits patients, either by “directly defraying the high cost of prescriptions” or by “supporting critical patient care services”.62 The draft would let a hospital keep upfront discounts only if it passed the full value of every discount to patients. It would also require a federally set sliding fee scale, with a cap of $0 for patients below the poverty line.62,64 The AHA’s reply begins, “While the AHA supports efforts to help patients afford their medications,” and goes on that this approach “overlooks the purpose and structure of the 340B program”.62 The SUSTAIN bill, which the AHA supports, would instead apply each hospital’s financial-assistance policy at its child sites.65
The hospitals also ask Congress to bar “discriminatory practices by health plans and pharmacy benefit managers”.63 That is a fight over who keeps the spread. If a plan pays less for a 340B prescription, part of the spread moves from the hospital to the payer. Which outcome is preferable depends on what the retained money finances and whether the purchaser’s savings reach patients or plan sponsors.
Drug makers ask for fewer discounted units and more information. Manufacturers pay the discount, and the statute lets them audit a covered entity’s use of it.3 Their preferred fixes, rebates and a narrower patient definition, would reduce the number of units sold at the ceiling price. The money from those units would stay with the manufacturer. It would lower what a patient pays only if a second rule said so. The same holds for any proposal that narrows the program, including the candidate below.
Since 2020 drug makers have limited 340B sales through contract pharmacies, and two federal appeals courts have held that the statute allows it. “Nowhere does Section 340B mention contract pharmacies,” one wrote.28 A valid concern about duplicate discounts should not be dismissed because the manufacturer benefits. But manufacturer revenue restored by a restriction is not automatically a saving for a patient or insurer.
Their current vehicle is a rebate. Under an upfront discount, the entity needs less cash when it acquires the drug. Under a rebate model, it first pays more and later submits information to recover the difference. HRSA’s revised pilot is scheduled to start on January 1, 2027, for the drugs chosen for Medicare’s price negotiation.66 A covered entity buys at the list price and claims a rebate equal to that price minus the ceiling price. The manufacturer must pay or deny with documentation within 10 days of a complete submission, and may not deny over its own concern about diversion or duplicate discounts.66 Paying $1,000 now and receiving $400 later requires $400 more working capital than paying $600 upfront. A first version of the pilot was enjoined in December 2025 and vacated in February 2026.67 The AHA, the Maine Hospital Association and four hospitals challenged the revised version on October 9, 2026.68 The court set oral argument for November 18, and as of November 14, 2026, no ruling had been issued.69
HRSA audits hospitals and clinics, and it audits drug makers. It posted results for 176 audits of hospitals and clinics for fiscal 2025.70 In HRSA’s published table, 34 list a finding of diversion, meaning a 340B drug went to someone who was not the entity’s patient, and 78 list no adverse finding.70 A diversion finding requires repayment to the manufacturer, and it is not a finding of fraud. HRSA chooses most of the entities it audits at random from groups it judges riskier, by purchase volume and the use of contract pharmacies among other things. It targets the rest on allegations.21,71 GAO reported in 2018 that the split was about 90% and 10%.21 So these counts describe a sample chosen for risk, not a national rate. The audited hospitals are not named here, because the 34 range from large systems to rural clinics, and picking a few would accuse them of more than the audits found. HRSA also posted results for five manufacturer audits in each of fiscal 2024, 2025 and 2026.72 Several found that the company had “charged more than the 340B ceiling price” and ordered it to repay covered entities. The companies named are mostly generic makers.72
One court case is unresolved. In March 2026 a federal appeals court revived a hospital system’s False Claims Act suit against AbbVie, AstraZeneca, Novartis, Sanofi and affiliates, holding only that its claims were adequately pleaded.73 The suit alleges ceiling-price overcharges. No court has found the companies liable.
The Community Oncology Alliance, COA, speaks for independent oncology practices. COA asks Congress to “Base hospital eligibility on meaningful, auditable outpatient safety-net performance”.74 COA says it “is not asking Congress to extend 340B eligibility to independent community oncology practices”.74 It is a member of AIR340B, a coalition that also lists PhRMA and several drug makers, and its members compete with hospitals for the same infusion patients.75 COA’s proposal is close to mine, and COA has an interest in it. I have one too. I work in hospital oncology, in a system that takes part in 340B, and the change argued here could apply to its hospitals.
HRSA can count and audit, but only Congress can change the gate. GAO examined 258 nongovernmental hospitals that HRSA reviewed in 2017 and 2018. Of them, 18 sent documents that “did not appear to be contracts”.76 Another 13 sent contracts that did not appear to require serving the low-income population, and all were allowed to stay in the program.76 GAO told HRSA in 2020 that it does not require hospitals to repay duplicate discounts in Medicaid managed care. The health department disagreed with two of GAO’s three recommendations, and as of March 2026 all three remained open.77 Courts have limited HRSA from both sides. One struck down its narrow patient definition, two held that drug makers may restrict contract-pharmacy sales, and one enjoined its first rebate pilot.28,67
No bill before Congress changes the count of inpatient days by which a hospital qualifies. The SUSTAIN 340B Act, S. 5244, was introduced in August 2026 by Jerry Moran, Republican of Kansas.65 Its cosponsors are Senators Tammy Baldwin of Wisconsin, Shelley Moore Capito of West Virginia, Tim Kaine of Virginia, John Boozman of Arkansas and John Hickenlooper of Colorado. Three are Democrats and two are Republicans. The bill protects upfront discounts and contract pharmacies and would end the rebate pilot. It adds a three-year wait for newly acquired sites, applies the hospital’s financial-assistance policy at child sites and requires reporting by payer.65 It sets no test of whom a child site serves.
Senator Cassidy released a discussion draft in June 2026.78 It lets manufacturers choose among upfront discounts, discounts after claims data, and rebates. It adds need tests for child sites and caps what patients pay, but it does not change how a hospital qualifies.64,78 The SECURE 340B Act, H.R. 9599, comes closest. For private nonprofit hospitals it would tighten the government-contract test, the gap GAO found, and require yearly verification of nonprofit status.79 It is also the one bill that puts a patient test into statutory language. A child site would qualify if it lies in a socially vulnerable ZIP-code area. Failing that, it would qualify if “not less than 40 percent of patients served” are on Medicaid, uninsured or at or below 200% of the poverty line.79 The 11.75% line stays where it is. Senator Cassidy’s draft and the SECURE bill would both bar administrators’ fees tied to the price of the drug. The draft requires flat amounts, and the bill bars fees set as a share of revenue or volume.64,79
All three are proposals, and a discussion draft is not enacted law. Medicare’s 2027 payment rule is final, and it pays for 340B drugs at the average sales price minus 28%.80 It changes what Medicare pays and leaves eligibility alone.
Measure the clinics first
The first step does not depend on anyone’s preferred reform. Congress should require each 340B hospital to report whom its outpatient sites and pharmacy channels serve and what the discount earns there, on one set of definitions. Hospitals would report by site and payer for several years, which the SECURE and SUSTAIN bills already require in part, before any eligibility consequence.65,79 New sites would get a grace period from opening. The premise of this essay has not been tested patient by patient, and the reporting is the test.
The data would be the hospital’s own audited claims, not state files. Hospitals should already be able to sort 340B claims by payer, since they bill insurers and must avoid duplicate discounts. The inspector general found in 2021 that most states’ payment data for Medicaid managed care were incomplete or inaccurate.81
What Congress should then do with the numbers depends on what it wants the discount to pay for, and the debate runs several aims together. One is patient need, meaning how many poor patients a hospital and its sites treat. Another is uncompensated burden, the care a hospital gives and is not paid for. A third is the value of the discounted drugs that poor patients receive. These come apart. A psychiatric unit or a labor ward that serves the poor carries need and burden and uses few costly drugs. An infusion center uses a great deal of discount whoever sits in its chairs.
The SECURE bill counts patients, as a fallback. A child site whose ZIP code does not qualify can still pass if 40% of its patients are on Medicaid, uninsured or poor.79 A count like that is easy to explain and to audit. Its weakness is that a site can pass on visits while most of its drug volume is commercial.
Medicare has gone the other way for its own money, toward uncompensated care. MedPAC’s index counts a hospital’s uncompensated care as a share of revenue, beside its low-income Medicare patients, inpatient and outpatient.33 It was built to distribute Medicare payments. It is a precedent for measuring more than inpatient days, and it does not validate any 340B formula, including the one below. The entry gate’s own arithmetic could be repaired in the same direction, by counting uninsured patients in the numerator and outpatients beside inpatients. The sources would be the audited cost-report worksheet that Medicare already uses for uncompensated care and the hospital’s own claims.
One candidate formula and its risks
The candidate below weighs the drugs themselves. This is the design I would put forward. Every part of it is reasoning from the evidence above, and none of it has been tested.
The test would count patients and prescriptions, never margin dollars. For each child site and each contract-pharmacy channel, count the 340B administrations and fills that go to low-income patients. Those are patients on Medicaid, uninsured, eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid, or receiving the hospital’s financial assistance. Weight each by the discount it uses, the gap between the list price and the ceiling price.
The weighting matters, because a test weighted by margin would fail every hospital by construction, since Medicaid fee-for-service pays near the ceiling price. Weighting by the discount counts low-income care in the unit of the subsidy the manufacturer gives, and it counts a Medicaid patient’s infusion the same as a commercial patient’s. It also uses statuses a hospital already records, where a test of income would need data hospitals do not collect from insured patients.
The reach would scale at the level of the network, with no site tested alone. A network’s 340B volume at its outpatient sites and pharmacies could run up to a set multiple of its low-income outpatient volume. Above the multiple, eligibility would taper and never stop at a cliff. This keeps the cross-subsidy, since commercial prescriptions still produce a spread, but only in proportion to the low-income drug volume behind it.
An example with invented numbers shows the taper. Call a network’s low-income volume, weighted by discount, one unit, and suppose the multiple is 3. A network whose 340B volume is 2.5 units keeps all of it. Suppose that above 3 units each further unit keeps a falling share of the discount, from all of it at 3 to none at 6. A network at 5 units keeps the first 3 in full. On the next 2 it keeps two-thirds on average, the midpoint of 100% and 33%, or 1.33 units. It keeps 4.33 of its 5 units, about 87%. The multiple is a policy choice, as arbitrary as 11.75 unless evidence fixes it.
A gate at the clinics would wait on the reporting. If it shows that child sites serve people as needy as the parent’s, the gate is unnecessary, and I would drop it.
The formula has its own perverse incentives. None has been seen, because it has never been tried.
It favors expensive, deeply discounted drugs. A hospital that treats poor patients with costly infusions would earn more reach than one that gives them psychiatric, emergency, obstetric or primary care with little drug spending. That second hospital may be doing more for the poor. Drug selection and price changes would also move the allowance. A list price rises, or a pharmacy committee switches products, and a network’s reach changes while its patients are exactly as poor as before.
Counting only 340B administrations and fills would undercount low-income patients whose drugs are kept out of 340B. Medicaid fee-for-service prescriptions at contract pharmacies are the plain case, since HRSA bars them by default.30 A hospital could treat many such patients and get no credit for them.
A boundary drawn around a whole network could reward acquisitions. A system could buy sites with enough qualifying volume to carry more commercial expansion elsewhere, and a rule meant to limit growth would reward buying more sites.
The settlement is undefined, and it would have to be defined before anyone could vote on the rule. “Keeps the discount” could mean that the hospital keeps full discounts on chosen prescriptions. It could mean a smaller discount on every prescription, or a repayment of part of the savings after the year closes, or the loss of eligibility at chosen sites. Each lands differently on patients, on a hospital’s cash, on manufacturers and on the administrators who would run it. Site loss also brings back the cliff, one site at a time. Until the unit, the boundary of a network, the treatment of excluded prescriptions and the settlement are defined, Figure 6 illustrates an allocation rule and is not a bill.
Whatever Congress chooses, rural hospitals would keep a path of their own. Critical access hospitals, sole community hospitals and rural referral centers would keep today’s eligibility, with reporting only and no new ratio. They already face no percentage test or a lower one, small volumes make ratios noisy, and a rural infusion chair serves whoever lives nearby. Joining 340B was associated with rural hospitals being 8.3 percentage points more likely to add oncology services.82 But critical access hospitals in the most vulnerable areas are the least likely to take part at all, so a rural path does little for them.83
Any change to the gate would also be paired with a patient rule. A low-income patient’s cost-sharing for a 340B drug would be capped at every 340B site. A gate alone moves money to manufacturers. Senator Cassidy’s $0 cap below the poverty line and SUSTAIN’s extension of financial assistance are two proposed forms.64,65
None of these options decides how the money is spent, which is a separate rule on the use of funds. Each adds measurement cost, and part of that cost would be paid to the administrators described above. Even audited spending allocations would leave a second problem, because money is fungible. If an institution assigns $5 million of 340B contribution to a clinic it already operated, it can redirect $5 million previously budgeted to that clinic. This is a hypothetical accounting example.
The strongest case against me
The strongest argument is that the cross-subsidy is the design, and a gate at the clinics attacks the money where it is made. Commercial patients produce the spread. It pays for a parent hospital that serves the poor and often loses money. Richmond Community is the example, in its owner’s words, and the AHA says nearly 44% of 340B hospitals run negative margins.2,5 A rule that asked every money-making site to serve mostly poor patients would be bound to shrink the spread, and it could close the hospitals the program keeps open.
Much of that is true. In places the cross-subsidy is the reason a hospital is open. But the argument sets no limit. Under current law the reach has none, and no one can see whether the benefit keeps pace with it. For a hospital whose network really does pay for care of the poor, measuring costs only the reporting, and it lets the hospital prove its case. A tapered rule, if Congress chose one, would still let a network earn on insured patients. It would tie how far that goes to the low-income outpatients the network treats.
Evidence favorable to the safety-net rationale deserves equal specificity. Newly participating public hospitals increased their offering of services that lose money, a change not seen broadly among nonprofit hospitals, whose one significant increase was in oncology.84 Health centers that registered more 340B locations saw about 0.4% more uninsured and low-income patients for each added location, in a descriptive study.85 All 29 covered entities GAO interviewed in 2011 said the program helped them maintain services and lower drug costs for patients, in a sample GAO called not generalizable.86 Near the cutoff, eligibility was associated with commercial unit prices 25% lower, concentrated in competitive markets, in claims from 2012 to 2014.87
The findings on charity care divide. One study found a 28.9% increase in charity care after hospitals joined, and its authors concluded that the increases “appear to be fully offset by reductions in other community benefit programs”.88 Another found no evidence that uncompensated care rose after entry.89 A third associated new participation with about $4,075 more spending per episode of five cancer biologics among commercially insured patients. Its new entrants were mostly small and rural hospitals, and earlier participants were less likely to show the increase.90
A scoping review of 44 studies found the same split. Its highest-quality evidence indicates that nonprofit disproportionate share hospitals “may be using the 340B program in margin-motivated ways”.91 That finding “is not consistent across other hospital types and public health clinics”.91 So the critical evidence is strongest for nonprofit disproportionate share hospitals, and a new gate would bind them first. It is possible for all these findings to be true. A public hospital keeps more money-losing services, such as psychiatric care, a health center expands HIV testing, a hospital system acquires a profitable infusion practice, and a pharmacy intermediary earns more fees.
A new ratio costs money to compute, creates a line of its own, and invites behavior no one has studied. Washington State’s hospitals warned that a site test “incentivizes consolidation back to the main hospital campus”.92 The AHA allows that payer-mix measures “may provide useful context” and objects to them as “rigid eligibility conditions”.93 The current gate is volatile too, by the hospitals’ own account. The AHA warned in 2021 that pandemic changes in payer mix threatened some hospitals’ eligibility.94 A finance association reports that roughly 425 hospitals could lose it on their next cost report.95 The rural hospitals’ association calls 340B savings “an essential source of financial stability” and counts 417 rural hospitals as vulnerable to closure.96
A gate alone also helps no patient. Fewer qualifying units leave more money with manufacturers. Infusion volume could return to independent practices, including those in networks that McKesson serves or that Cencora has controlled since February 2, 2026.54,97 Those are the parties that gain from a narrower gate, alongside COA’s members.
The timing is bad, too. In 2027 the same hospitals meet Medicare’s lower payment for 340B drugs and a faster repayment of earlier years, which the companion essay works through.80 A narrower gate would land on top of both.
Check
Two tests are possible here, and passing one proves nothing about the other.
The first is whether the outpatient expansion serves a different population. Take each 340B hospital’s own claims and compute the low-income share of patients at every child site and contract-pharmacy channel. Compare it with the low-income share of the parent’s own inpatients and of the outpatients on its main campus, counted the same way. If the child sites’ share matches the parent’s, the mismatch described here belongs to Richmond and a few places like it, and it has been overstated.
The second is whether the added money sustains added affordable care. A comparison of patients cannot settle that. A child site full of insured patients could be paying for a great deal of charity care, and one whose patients are as poor as the parent’s could be paying for none. This test needs net 340B revenue by site, set against the free and discounted care and the money-losing services that would shrink without it. Because money is fungible, a hospital’s own ledger will not do. The comparison has to be with similar hospitals that lack the revenue, or with the same hospital before it arrived. If care for the poor grows in step with outpatient 340B revenue, the cross-subsidy is working, and it matters much less that the inpatient gate cannot see outpatients.
The data for both tests are in each hospital’s own claims and its records of financial assistance, not yet in any public file. Minnesota’s 340B reports summarize each parent entity, child sites included, rather than each site.34 Its all-payer claims database holds claims sent by insurers and administrators, so it holds no data on care for the uninsured and has only what self-insured employer plans choose to send.98 A payer is also a rough stand-in for a patient’s income.
Some of the evidence points the other way. One analysis, sponsored by 340B Health and reported secondhand, found that 22.8% of Medicare patients receiving cancer drugs at 340B disproportionate share hospitals in 2014 were dually eligible for Medicaid. The figure in physician offices was 14.0%.99 It comes from an interested party, and its method is not described. Still, it is patient-level and it favors hospitals. Public hospitals added money-losing services, prices were lower near the cutoff where markets were competitive, and the central case is a single hospital the committee’s majority staff examined after press reports.
The public record documents violations found by audit, with repayment ordered, by hospitals and by drug makers. It also documents arrangements that are lawful and that no rule requires anyone to explain.
The arithmetic can be checked. The gate counts inpatient days only, the day of an uninsured patient who is not eligible for Medicaid lowers the score, and the spread is made in outpatient settings. How far a parent’s patients differ from its child sites’ patients is less certain, because no study here measures it hospital by hospital. I am least sure what hospitals near a new line would cut.
Two results would change my mind about the inpatient gate. One is patient-level data showing that child sites serve people as needy as the parent’s. The other is evidence that hospitals near a site test cut care for the poor instead of shedding affluent sites.
The evidence most likely to change my assessment is audited financial information paired with credible evidence that the additional resources preserve or expand affordable care. My confidence is high that consistent definitions would improve interpretation; it is lower that disclosure alone would change conduct.
Some things are missing. What any one hospital would gain or lose needs that hospital’s claims. The formula is not defined well enough to legislate. Health centers and Ryan White clinics, whose rules differ, get little space. The central case rests on one party’s staff report, and the bills and the lawsuit may move after November 14, 2026.
The program’s original promise, to help scarce resources reach further, remains defensible. Its current financial architecture makes that promise difficult to verify because eligibility, revenue generation, and public benefit are measured at different points by different organizations. The question every participant should answer is therefore the same. After the drug is purchased, the patient is treated, the claim is paid, and the fees are collected, what additional care did this arrangement make possible, and for whom?
Disclosure
The opinions here are my own and reflect my point of view, not that of the institutions I work for, and none of them has endorsed this essay. The facts come from the public sources cited, and any correction is dated under the title.
Sources
- 340B Report, September 29, 2022. Fallout from the New York Times’s 340B investigative piece: a trade publication’s summary of the Times (September 24, 2022) and the Richmond Times-Dispatch, with the neighborhood, the sites’ location, the $18 million in free care and Bon Secours’s statement of compliance. 340breport.com ↑
- U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, majority staff report, April 2025. Congress Must Act to Bring Needed Reforms to the 340B Drug Pricing Program: Richmond Community Hospital and Cleveland Clinic figures and statements, Bon Secours’s letters in the appendix, CVS and Walgreens fees and responses, and the five largest contract-pharmacy companies. One party’s staff report, not an adjudicated finding. PDF ↑
- 42 U.S.C. § 256b: covered entities, the ceiling price, the 11.75 percent test, the other hospital routes, diversion, duplicate discounts and audits. law.cornell.edu ↑
- WTKR News 3, September 26, 2022. Virginia senator calls NYT investigation troubling: “Bon Secours needs to have an answer.” wtkr.com ↑
- American Hospital Association, October 23, 2025. Statement to the Senate HELP Committee on the 340B program: “nearly 44% of 340B hospitals operated on a negative margin” in fiscal 2023 cost reports. An interested party’s figure. aha.org ↑
- H.R. Rep. No. 102-384, pt. 2, at 9–12 (1992), as reproduced in a continuing-education packet: the best-price problem and the committee’s stated intent. PDF ↑
- 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(1): the definition of average manufacturer price. govinfo.gov ↑
- HRSA, Office of Pharmacy Affairs Information System. Pricing formulas: “340B Ceiling Price = (AMP - URA)”; and Medicaid.gov, unit rebate amount calculation. hrsa.gov, medicaid.gov ↑
- Nikpay, Reinke & Quinones, Milbank Quarterly, 2026. A legislative history of 340B from 175 internal documents and 19 interviews; funded by the Commonwealth Fund. doi.org ↑
- Congressional Budget Office, September 9, 2025. Growth in the 340B Drug Pricing Program: purchases of $6.6 billion (2010) and $43.9 billion (2021), the 87% outpatient share, integration as the largest factor, and no statutory rule on use of revenue. cbo.gov, PDF ↑
- HRSA HIV/AIDS Bureau, March 21, 2016. Frequently asked questions on Policy Clarification Notices 15-03 and 15-04: 340B revenue as program income and its permitted uses. PDF ↑
- HRSA. 2025 340B covered entity purchases, accurate as of June 30, 2026: $100.0 billion in total and $79.2 billion by disproportionate share hospitals. hrsa.gov ↑
- HRSA. Disproportionate share hospitals: eligibility on the most recently filed cost report; for-profit hospitals are not eligible. hrsa.gov ↑
- Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Disproportionate share hospital (DSH): the patient-percentage formula and the 25%/75% split of DSH money since the Affordable Care Act. cms.gov ↑
- 42 C.F.R. § 412.106: which days count, the adjustment formula for urban hospitals of 100 or more beds, and the 12 percent cap. law.cornell.edu ↑
- Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, May 2015. Report to the Congress: Overview of the 340B Drug Pricing Program: outpatient sites do not affect the percentage; DSH payments as a proxy for uncompensated care. PDF ↑
- U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, October 11, 2017. Examining How Covered Entities Utilize the 340B Drug Pricing Program, Serial No. 115-63: testimony of Northside Hospital’s director of finance. govinfo.gov ↑
- HRSA, October 27, 2023. Notice on registration of off-site outpatient facilities, 88 Fed. Reg.: the cost-report test for child sites. PDF ↑
- HRSA. Frequently asked question: can non-Medicaid patients receive 340B drugs? hrsa.gov ↑
- HRSA, October 24, 1996. Notice regarding the 340B patient and entity eligibility definition, 61 Fed. Reg. 55156. govinfo.gov ↑
- U.S. Government Accountability Office, June 2018. GAO-18-480: contract pharmacies from about 1,300 (2010) to nearly 20,000 (2017); how HRSA selects entities for audit; discounts to uninsured patients at 30 of 55 entities reviewed. gao.gov ↑
- AbbVie v. Wrigley, No. 1:25-cv-00182 (D.N.D. April 27, 2026), order at 7–9: the replenishment model, described from a manufacturer’s declaration. govinfo.gov ↑
- Healthcare Dive, September 2025. A report of CBO’s figures on off-site clinics, 2013 and 2021. healthcaredive.com ↑
- Zeng, Sarraille & Martin, Health Affairs Scholar 3:qxaf104, 2025. What is driving 340B growth: utilization or price? Partly supported by the National Pharmaceutical Council; editorial control retained by IQVIA; data not public. PMC ↑
- National Pharmaceutical Council. Members: “supported by leading biopharmaceutical companies.” npcnow.org ↑
- Advis, February 15, 2021. Establish medication management clinic to expand 340B benefit. A consultant’s marketing. advis.com ↑
- CPS. 340B referral capture. A vendor’s marketing, undated, read in November 2026. cps.com ↑
- Congressional Research Service, September 10, 2025, R48696 (archival copy): Sanofi-Aventis v. HHS (3d Cir.), Novartis v. Johnson (D.C. Cir.) and Genesis Healthcare v. Becerra. everycrsreport.com ↑
- CMS, February 11, 2016. State Health Official letter #16-001: Medicaid payment at actual acquisition cost plus a dispensing fee; 340B drugs not above the ceiling price. PDF ↑
- HRSA. Frequently asked question on Medicaid fee-for-service patients at contract pharmacies. hrsa.gov ↑
- HRSA, March 5, 2010. Notice regarding 340B contract pharmacy services, 75 Fed. Reg. 10272. govinfo.gov ↑
- HHS Office of Inspector General, February 4, 2014. OEI-05-13-00431, Contract pharmacy arrangements in the 340B program: a purposive sample of 30 covered entities. oig.hhs.gov ↑
- Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, March 2023. Report to the Congress, chapter 3: the DSH formula and the three parts of the Medicare Safety-Net Index. PDF ↑
- Minnesota Department of Health, February 27, 2026. 340B Covered Entity Report, 2025 (2024 data): payments, acquisition and operating costs, net revenue, payer estimates and limitations. Self-reported and unaudited. PDF ↑
- Maine Revised Statutes, Title 22, § 1728, subsection 2-A (P.L. 2025, c. 388): annual 340B hospital reports to the Maine Health Data Organization beginning July 1, 2026, by payor type. legislature.maine.gov ↑
- Washington State Legislature, Engrossed Second Substitute Senate Bill 5981, Chapter 227, Laws of 2026, effective June 11, 2026, section 5: annual 340B reports to the Health Care Authority, by payer type where available. PDF ↑
- Robinson, Kosorukov & Whaley, JAMA 335:1243–1249, 2026. Hospital adoption and pricing for oncology biosimilars: Blue Cross Blue Shield claims, 2020–2024; acquisition prices estimated; supported by the NIHCM Foundation. jamanetwork.com ↑
- NIHCM Foundation. Board of directors. nihcm.org ↑
- 340B Report, January 2023. MedPAC votes to recommend ditching Medicare DSH patient percentage for Medicare purposes. Trade press, the source of the director’s quotation. 340breport.com ↑
- Desai & McWilliams, New England Journal of Medicine 378:539–548, 2018. Consequences of the 340B Drug Pricing Program: regression discontinuity at the 11.75 percent threshold, Medicare claims. doi.org ↑
- American Hospital Association, February 5, 2018. Major methodological flaws negate findings of recent 340B study. An interested party’s reply. aha.org ↑
- Mulligan, Romley & Myerson, BMC Research Notes 14, 2021. Hospitals just above and below the 340B threshold, 2014–2016, with investor-owned hospitals as a placebo. doi.org ↑
- Thome, Odouard & Buntin, JAMA Health Forum 7(10):e263977, 2026. Hospital 340B participation, site-dependent payment, and vertical integration: difference in differences, 122 new 340B hospitals against 779 others, traditional Medicare claims 2016–2019. PMC ↑
- Conti & Bach, Health Affairs 33(10), 2014. The 340B drug discount program: hospitals generate profits by expanding to reach more affluent communities. 960 hospitals and 3,964 clinics. doi.org ↑
- Liu, Russo, Kesselheim, Knox, Sarpatwari & Feldman, Health Services Research, 2025. Serial cross-section of newly registered hospitals, child sites and contract pharmacies, 2010–2022, by a social deprivation index. doi.org ↑
- Masia, Filson, Martin & Neumann, Health Affairs Scholar, 2025. Child-site locations in 2022; funded by Johnson & Johnson. doi.org ↑
- 340B Informed. Hospitals rebut Health Affairs study’s 340B conclusions: the reply of the hospitals’ association, now 340B Health. A hospital-aligned outlet. 340bemployed.org ↑
- PhRMA, February 2025. Follow the Dollar: wholesalers, chargebacks, and who benefits from a 340B transaction. An interested party’s report. PDF ↑
- Gabler, New York Times, February 12, 2026, as republished by GV Wire. Senate questions health care firm for profiting off program meant for poor. gvwire.com ↑
- Senator Bill Cassidy, chairman, Senate HELP Committee, February 1, 2026. Letter to Apexus. A senator’s questions, not findings. PDF ↑
- Becker’s Hospital Review. 340B contractor boosts profits while driving up patient costs: report. The source of Apexus’s statement. beckershospitalreview.com ↑
- Cencora, Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2025. PDF ↑
- McKesson. Protecting hospitals and patients with 340B: Macro Helix’s clients. The company’s own account. mckesson.com ↑
- McKesson, June 2025. McKesson Corporation completes acquisition of Core Ventures. mckesson.com ↑
- CVS Health, Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2025. PDF ↑
- Pharmacy services agreement between AIDS Service Association of Pinellas (EPIC) and Community Specialty Pharmacy, effective April 1, 2021, Exhibit 10.22 to a 2024 SEC filing. sec.gov ↑
- Federal Trade Commission, July 9, 2024. Interim staff report on pharmacy benefit managers. ftc.gov ↑
- Lincoln International. Verity Solutions has been sold to Express Scripts, a division of Cigna. A deal adviser’s notice. lincolninternational.com ↑
- PhRMA, lobbying report (LD-2), third quarter of 2026: $7,040,000 across all issues. lda.gov ↑
- American Hospital Association, lobbying report (LD-2), third quarter of 2026: $3,840,000 across all issues. lda.gov ↑
- 340B Health, lobbying report (LD-2), third quarter of 2026: $330,000 across all issues. lda.gov ↑
- American Hospital Association, August 25, 2026. Feedback on the 340B Drug Pricing Integrity and Affordability for Patients Act discussion draft. aha.org ↑
- American Hospital Association, October 27, 2026. Comments on the SUSTAIN 340B Act, S. 5244, to its six sponsors. aha.org ↑
- Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy, July 14, 2026. Summary of the Cassidy discussion draft and the SECURE 340B Act: the $0 cap below the poverty line, child-site tests and flat administrator fees. A trade group’s summary. PDF ↑
- S. 5244, SUSTAIN 340B Act, 119th Congress, introduced August 5, 2026. govinfo.gov ↑
- HRSA, August 3, 2026. 340B Rebate Model Pilot Program, revised notice, 91 Fed. Reg. 48883. govinfo.gov ↑
- National Law Review, February 25, 2026. 340B rebate model pilot program effectively ends, preserving upfront discounts for now. natlawreview.com ↑
- American Hospital Association v. Kennedy, No. 1:26-cv-00515 (D. Me.), plaintiffs’ motion, October 2026. Allegations and legal arguments, not judicial findings. PDF ↑
- American Hospital Association v. Kennedy, No. 1:26-cv-00515 (D. Me.), notice of hearing, November 6, 2026: oral argument set for November 18, 2026. Court document reproduced by Georgetown’s Health Care Litigation Tracker. PDF ↑
- HRSA. Program integrity: fiscal year 2025 audit results for covered entities. hrsa.gov ↑
- HRSA, February 8, 2013. Clarification of HRSA audits of 340B covered entities, Release No. 2012-1.1: risk-based and targeted audits. PDF ↑
- HRSA. Program integrity: manufacturer audit results for fiscal years 2024, 2025 and 2026. FY 2024, FY 2025, FY 2026 ↑
- United States ex rel. Adventist Health System/West v. AbbVie Inc., No. 24-2180 (9th Cir. March 17, 2026): reversal of a dismissal for failure to state a claim. PDF ↑
- Community Oncology Alliance, August 19, 2026. Announcement of its recommendations on Senator Cassidy’s discussion draft, distributed by EIN Presswire. An interested party’s statement. einpresswire.com ↑
- Alliance for Integrity and Reform of 340B. Members. 340breform.org ↑
- U.S. Government Accountability Office, December 2019, released January 2020. GAO-20-108: nongovernmental hospitals’ contracts. gao.gov ↑
- U.S. Government Accountability Office, January 2020, with recommendation status through March 2026. GAO-20-212: duplicate discounts in Medicaid managed care. gao.gov ↑
- Senate HELP Committee, June 2026. Section-by-section summary of the 340B Drug Pricing Integrity and Affordability for Patients Act discussion draft. help.senate.gov ↑
- H.R. 9599, SECURE 340B Act, 119th Congress, introduced July 6, 2026. govinfo.gov ↑
- CMS, November 4, 2026. Fact sheet, CY 2027 OPPS and ASC final rule: payment for 340B drugs at the average sales price minus 28% and the faster repayment. cms.gov ↑
- HHS Office of Inspector General, March 2021. OEI-02-19-00180: states’ Medicaid managed-care payment data. oig.hhs.gov ↑
- Owsley & Bradley, Health Affairs 42(6), 2023. Rural hospitals’ 340B participation and oncology services, 2011–2020. doi.org ↑
- Owsley & Karim, Journal of Rural Health, 2024. Critical access hospitals, community vulnerability and 340B participation. doi.org ↑
- Owsley and colleagues, JAMA Health Forum, 2024. 340B participation and unprofitable services: difference in differences, 2,152 hospitals, 2010–2019. doi.org ↑
- Watts and colleagues, JAMA Health Forum, 2024. 340B registered locations at federally qualified health centers: descriptive retrospective cohort. jamanetwork.com ↑
- U.S. Government Accountability Office, September 2011. GAO-11-836: interviews with 29 covered entities, a judgmental sample. gao.gov ↑
- Desai and colleagues, Health Services Research, 2026. 340B eligibility and negotiated drug prices: regression discontinuity, commercial claims 2012–2014. doi.org ↑
- Nikpay, Buntin & Conti, Health Services Research 55(2), 2020. 340B participation, charity care and community benefit. doi.org ↑
- Desai & McWilliams, American Journal of Managed Care 27(10):432–437, 2021. 340B and hospital provision of uncompensated care, 2003–2015. doi.org ↑
- Chang and colleagues, JAMA Health Forum, 2023. Hospital 340B participation and spending on five oncology biologics, commercially insured patients, 2007–2019. jamanetwork.com ↑
- Levengood and colleagues, Milbank Quarterly, 2024. A scoping review of 44 studies of the 340B program. doi.org ↑
- Washington State Hospital Association, August 27, 2026. Comment letter on Senator Cassidy’s discussion draft. An interested party’s statement. PDF ↑
- American Hospital Association, September 23, 2026. Comments on the SECURE 340B Act. aha.org ↑
- American Hospital Association, September 2021. Fact sheet: 340B-related payer mix changes. PDF ↑
- Healthcare Financial Management Association, updated September 29, 2026. Continued 340B eligibility is at risk for hundreds of hospitals, citing rural-hospital association data. hfma.org ↑
- National Rural Health Association, August 28, 2026. Comment on the 340B reform discussion draft. An interested party’s statement. PDF ↑
- Cencora, Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2026. Acquisition of the majority of OneOncology, completed February 2, 2026. sec.gov ↑
- Minnesota House Research, August 2026. Minnesota All Payer Claims Database: sources of data; self-insured ERISA plans report voluntarily; and Minnesota Department of Health, About the MN APCD: no data on care for the uninsured. PDF, health.state.mn.us ↑
- 340B Informed, May 2017. 340B hospitals treat more low-income cancer patients than non-340B providers: a Dobson DaVanzo analysis for 340B Health, 2014 Medicare Part B data, reported secondhand. 340binformed.org ↑