5h Healthcare Essay

Which patients should qualify a hospital for 340B?

A hospital qualifies for 340B on its inpatients and earns on its outpatients.

Contents
  1. In short
  2. 01Why Congress created an institutional subsidy
  3. 02The gate counts inpatient days
  4. 03Child sites qualify through the parent’s cost report
  5. 04Payment rules decide where the margin is made
  6. 0511.75% was chosen to qualify particular hospitals
  7. 06Hospitals near the line changed
  8. 07Who benefits along the entire pipeline
  9. 08The lobbying is a fight over specific financial rights
  10. 09Measure the clinics first
  11. 10One candidate formula and its risks
  12. 11The strongest case against me
  13. 12Check
  14. Keep
  15. 13Disclosure
  16. Sources

Today the law says the patients in its beds. A hos­pital enters 340B on a count of inpa­tient days, and the money it then makes depends on out­pa­tients the count never looks at. So an inpa­tient measure cannot, by itself, show that a growing out­pa­tient drug busi­ness pro­duces a safety-net benefit to match. Congress should require that rela­tion­ship to be mea­sured before it decides how eli­gi­bility should change.

Take one hos­pital. Richmond Community Hospital is a Bon Secours hos­pital in Richmond, Virginia, in a neigh­bor­hood the New York Times described as pre­dom­i­nantly Black and low-income.1 Bon Secours says Medicaid patients account for 53% of the hospital’s inpa­tient admis­sions.2 The hos­pital takes part in 340B, a federal program that obliges drug makers to sell certain providers out­pa­tient drugs at a dis­count.2,3 Attached to it is a network of out­pa­tient infu­sion centers, spe­cialty clinics and phar­ma­cies, and that network is where its 340B money is made. From September 2018 to September 2023 the hos­pital reported $276.5 million in benefit from the program.2 The majority staff of the Senate health com­mittee found that all of the savings on drugs that physi­cians admin­ister came from the provider-based out­pa­tient infu­sion centers, and none from the hos­pital itself. Bon Secours’s own letter says “sub­stan­tially all”.2 The rest was phar­macy revenue, and Figure 1 gives the amounts. Bon Secours gave the com­mittee its reason. Opening infu­sion centers “in a com­mu­nity with a more favor­able payor mix,” it wrote, let the hos­pital stay in its own com­mu­nity. The savings, it said, “have allowed RCH to remain open, despite oper­ating at a sub­stan­tial loss for decades”.2

Its letter says the ser­vices at the hos­pital are pro­vided “at a loss of more than $33 million annu­ally”.2 The hospital’s list of child sites, it wrote, includes infu­sion centers, three oncology clinics, a gyne­co­logic oncology clinic, a rheuma­tology clinic and a hep­a­tology clinic.2 A 2022 Times inves­ti­ga­tion had described such sites as lying in wealthier parts of the city, by a trade publication’s summary.1 Bon Secours told the com­mittee that the Times’s account of the infu­sion centers was “in every way inac­cu­rate”.2 It says it com­plies with the program, and it told the Times it had pro­vided nearly $18 million in free care to poor patients at the hos­pital since 2018.1 The record used here holds no finding against the hospital.

Outpatient infusion centers $232.1MBon Secours’s own pharmacies, 84%Outside pharmacies under contract, 16%Reported savingsReported pharmacy revenue $44.4M0100200276.5340B benefit reported, $ millions
Figure 1Richmond Community Hospital’s reported 340B benefit, September 2018 to September 2023, by where it arose. Of $276.5 million, $232.1 million was reported savings on physician-administered drugs, which came from provider-based outpatient infusion centers. Another $44.4 million was reported revenue from drugs dispensed at pharmacies, and the staff report puts 84% of that revenue at Bon Secours’s own pharmacies. Savings and revenue are different measures, and the total is their sum. Bon Secours’s first letter gave about $39.4 million for the pharmacies and 84% of their claims, over the same five years. It later told the committee that the $39.4 million left out 2018 and 2019. Figures as the Senate committee’s majority staff states them in its April 2025 report.

The case drew the atten­tion of a Virginia senator at once. “I’m just worried the story is going to cause a lot of people to have really serious ques­tions about a program that our safety net providers need,” Senator Tim Kaine said.4 He went on, “so Bon Secours needs to have an answer, and we are going to dig into it from the health com­mittee stand­point”.4 The committee’s majority staff later exam­ined the hos­pital, and its 2025 report is the source of the figures above.

None of this breaks a rule. A dis­pro­por­tionate share hos­pital qual­i­fies for 340B by counting the Medicaid patients, and the Medicare patients on federal income support, who lie in its beds. An unin­sured patient in one of those beds who is not eli­gible for Medicaid lowers its score. The hos­pital then earns the money on drugs given in its out­pa­tient clinics and dis­pensed at phar­ma­cies. Some of those out­pa­tients are the same poor patients, and many may not be. The gate does not measure them either way.

A hos­pital advo­cate can accept every word of the Richmond account and call it the program suc­ceeding. Money made on insured patients across town kept a hos­pital open in a poor neigh­bor­hood. That may be what hap­pened. The trouble is that no rule asks anyone to show it, in Richmond or any­where else. My con­clu­sion is that 340B’s central account­ability problem is the gap between qual­i­fying for a finan­cial benefit and demon­strating its public return. The program can sustain valu­able ser­vices. It can also reward own­er­ship, referral capture, and control of phar­macy trans­ac­tions. These func­tions coexist. Eliminating a hospital’s margin does not auto­mat­i­cally help patients if the money moves to a man­u­fac­turer, phar­macy inter­me­diary, or payer.

I am sure of the diag­nosis, because it is arith­metic. I am much less sure of the fix. The formula I suggest later is one option, and I can already see how it could go wrong.

I lead a radi­a­tion oncology depart­ment in a hos­pital, and I also take part in cancer and oncology lead­er­ship for the health system I work in. That system takes part in 340B. The opin­ions in this essay are my own and reflect my point of view, not that of the insti­tu­tions I work for.

Richmond is one hos­pital, and its $276.5 million is a benefit, not a profit. The American Hospital Association, the AHA, says that “nearly 44% of 340B hos­pi­tals oper­ated on a neg­a­tive margin” in fiscal 2023.5 The evi­dence war­rants scru­tiny of the mech­a­nism, not a pre­sump­tion that every prof­itable pre­scrip­tion is improper.

Why Congress created an institutional subsidy

The program began as a repair. Medicaid’s drug rebate program, estab­lished in 1990, enti­tled Medicaid to a manufacturer’s best price. A deep dis­count to a clinic for the poor could there­fore raise the rebate the man­u­fac­turer owed on every Medicaid sale. The 1992 House com­mittee report described clinics and public hos­pi­tals losing their dis­counts, and it con­ceded that this was only one of many factors in pricing.6 Congress answered in the Veterans Health Care Act of 1992, which added section 340B to the Public Health Service Act.3

A man­u­fac­turer whose drugs Medicaid covers must offer covered out­pa­tient drugs to listed providers, called covered enti­ties, at or below a ceiling price.3 The ceiling starts from the drug’s average man­u­fac­turer price, or AMP, in the pre­vious quarter. AMP is a statu­tory average of what whole­salers pay for drugs bound for retail phar­ma­cies and what retail phar­ma­cies pay when they buy direct.3,7 From it the formula sub­tracts the rebate the man­u­fac­turer would owe Medicaid on the same unit.8 For most brand-name drugs that rebate is at least 23.1% of AMP, and more when the drug’s price has outrun infla­tion.8 So 340B is not a fixed percentage dis­count from list price.

Covered enti­ties include fed­er­ally qual­i­fied health centers, Ryan White HIV clinics, other clinics that live on federal grants, and several kinds of hos­pital.3 The com­mittee wrote that it intended “to enable these enti­ties to stretch scarce Federal resources as far as pos­sible, reaching more eli­gible patients and pro­viding more com­pre­hen­sive ser­vices”.6 The mech­a­nism was insti­tu­tional cross-subsidy. Lower the organization’s drug costs, and it can do more with its resources. It was not designed solely as a dis­count card handed to unin­sured patients at a phar­macy counter. An insured patient’s pre­scrip­tion gen­er­ating revenue for ser­vices used by someone else can there­fore be con­sis­tent with the orig­inal ratio­nale. The hard ques­tion is whether that second step happens, how much reaches it, and how it can be verified.

The program’s history is nar­rower than that reading. A 2026 history of the law was built from 175 internal doc­u­ments and 19 inter­views with 18 infor­mants, and funded by the Commonwealth Fund. It notes that the “stretch” lan­guage “does not appear any­where in the statute”.9 Its authors report that the drafters had in mind providers that depended on gov­ern­ment grants and had a mission to give free and dis­counted drugs.9 What hos­pi­tals now do with com­mer­cially insured patients is lawful. By this account, the drafters never discussed it.

Nor was every later expan­sion an admin­is­tra­tive acci­dent. Congress delib­er­ately added cat­e­gories of eli­gible hos­pi­tals, including through the Affordable Care Act.3,10 The more defen­sible crit­i­cism is that the program’s com­mer­cial reach expanded faster than the ability to measure its resulting public benefit.

When a pre­scrip­tion qual­i­fies for a safety-net dis­count, what addi­tional benefit is the patient, or the com­mu­nity, guar­an­teed to receive? For much of hos­pital-based 340B, the answer is less spe­cific than either side of the polit­ical argu­ment sug­gests. The Congressional Budget Office, CBO, reports that the statute “does not set require­ments for how par­tic­i­pating facil­i­ties use 340B net rev­enues”.10 Ryan White clinics are an excep­tion from outside the statute. Their grant rules treat 340B revenue as program income and list what it may pay for.11 So hos­pital find­ings cannot be gen­er­al­ized to every clinic.

A hos­pital col­lects more for a drug than it paid, and the gap between what the insurer and patient pay and the 340B price is the spread. The spread is not profit, because dis­pensing, nursing, fees and unpaid care come out of it. The companion essay follows one dose through that arith­metic under Medicare’s 2027 payment rule.

Three sep­a­rate claims hide in any state­ment about the spread: money was gen­er­ated, a par­tic­ular orga­ni­za­tion retained it, and patients ben­e­fited because of it. Evidence for one does not estab­lish the other two. Much of the 340B debate con­sists of answering the first ques­tion and pre­senting the answer as if it settled the third. The ques­tion before all three is which patients qual­i­fied the hospital.

The sums are large. Covered enti­ties bought $100.0 billion of drugs at 340B prices in 2025, by the count of the Health Resources and Services Administration, HRSA, the agency that runs the program. Hospitals that qualify through the test described next bought $79.2 billion of that.12 The figures measure acqui­si­tion spending, not $100 billion of savings, profit, gov­ern­ment outlays, or charity care.

The gate counts inpatient days

Most of the money comes through one cat­e­gory. A dis­pro­por­tionate share hos­pital, the cat­e­gory that bought the $79.2 billion, must pass three tests. It must be public, or a non­profit with a gov­ern­ment con­tract to serve low-income people. It must not buy out­pa­tient drugs through a group pur­chasing orga­ni­za­tion. And on its latest Medicare cost report it must show an adjust­ment percentage “greater than 11.75 percent”.3,13 For-profit hos­pi­tals cannot join.13

That percentage is a statu­tory cal­cu­la­tion, not a finding that 11.75% of its patients are unin­sured or receive charity care. It comes from Medicare’s inpa­tient payment system, and it is built in two steps.

The first step adds two ratios of days spent in the hospital’s beds. One takes the days of Medicare patients who also receive Supplemental Security Income, or SSI, the federal cash benefit for the aged and dis­abled poor, and divides by all Medicare days. The other takes the days of patients eli­gible for Medicaid but not Medicare and divides by all patient days. Medicare’s own state­ment of it is “DSH Patient Percent = (Medicare SSI Days / Total Medicare Days) + (Medicaid, Non-Medicare Days / Total Patient Days)”.14 Only days in acute-care units count, and beds used for out­pa­tient obser­va­tion are left out.15

The two ratios have dif­ferent denom­i­na­tors, so their sum is not the share of any group of patients. It is an index. No out­pa­tient visit, infu­sion or pre­scrip­tion enters it. Medicare’s advi­sory com­mis­sion, MedPAC, says so directly: “Outpatient sites affil­i­ated with a hos­pital do not affect the hospital’s DSH adjust­ment percentage”.16 A hospital’s director of finance told a House sub­com­mittee the same in 2017: “The DSH percentage is a rep­re­sen­ta­tion of inpatient days”.17

An unin­sured patient who is not eli­gible for Medicaid counts against the hos­pital. Her day enters only the denom­i­nator of the Medicaid ratio, so treating more such patients lowers the hospital’s score. The ratio turns on eli­gi­bility, not on who paid. An unin­sured patient who was eli­gible for Medicaid that day counts in the numer­ator, if the hos­pital can prove it, and so do some patients covered through a state’s federal waiver. Patients paid for from a waiver’s pool for uncom­pen­sated care do not.15

An example shows the size of it, and its numbers are invented for the purpose. A hos­pital has 100,000 inpa­tient days a year. Medicare patients account for 40,000 of them, and 3,200 of those belong to patients on SSI, so the first ratio is 8%. Medicaid patients without Medicare account for 20,000 days, so the second ratio is 20%. The index is 28%.

Now the hos­pital admits more poor patients, enough to add 5,000 days. If they are on Medicaid, the second ratio becomes 25,000 ÷ 105,000, or 23.8%, and the index rises to 31.8%. If they are unin­sured and not eli­gible for Medicaid, the ratio becomes 20,000 ÷ 105,000, or 19.0%, and the index falls to 27.0%. The patients are equally poor in both cases. Only their eli­gi­bility for Medicaid differs.

Medicare days: SSI days filled3,200 ÷ 40,000 = 8.0%All days: Medicaid days filled8.0% + 20.0% = 28.0%Add 5,000 Medicaid days8.0% + 23.8% = 31.8%In the numerator and the denominatorAdd 5,000 uninsured days8.0% + 19.0% = 27.0%In the denominator onlyNot eligible for Medicaid
Figure 2The index behind the 340B gate, for an example hospital, as two ratios of inpatient days. Adding 5,000 days of Medicaid patients raises the index from 28.0% to 31.8%. The same days from uninsured patients who are not eligible for Medicaid lower it to 27.0%, because such a day enters only a denominator. Example numbers, computed with the definitions in 42 C.F.R. § 412.106.

The second step turns the index into the adjust­ment percentage. For an urban hos­pital with 100 or more beds, the reg­u­la­tion sets the adjust­ment at 5.88% plus 82.5% of the amount by which the index exceeds 20.2%.15 Run that back­ward. An adjust­ment of 11.75% is 5.87 points above 5.88%, and 5.87 ÷ 0.825 is 7.1, so the index must exceed 20.2 + 7.1, or about 27.3%. The line that the statute writes as 11.75% is there­fore a sum of two inpa­tient ratios above about 27.3%.

Return to the example hos­pital. At an index of 28% its adjust­ment is 5.88 + 0.825 × 7.8, or 12.3%, and it qual­i­fies. With the unin­sured patients its index is 27.0%, its adjust­ment is 11.5%, and it does not. With the Medicaid patients its adjust­ment is 15.5%. A hos­pital at the line that admits more unin­sured patients, none of them eli­gible for Medicaid, can lose the dis­count for doing it.

9%13%15%17%24%26%28%30%32%11.75%27.3%Qualifies above this lineAs is, 28.0%With the Medicaid days, 31.8%With the uninsured days, 27.0%:does not qualifyAdjustment = 5.88% + 82.5% of the index above 20.2%Index: the two ratios of inpatient days, added
Figure 3How Medicare’s formula turns the index of inpatient days into the adjustment percentage, for an urban hospital with 100 or more beds. The statute’s line of 11.75% meets the formula at an index of about 27.3%, and the example hospital sits just above it at 28.0%. With 5,000 more days of uninsured patients who are not eligible for Medicaid, it sits just below, at 27.0%. Drawn from the formula in 42 C.F.R. § 412.106(d)(2)(i).

Other hos­pi­tals qualify by other tests, and none of them looks at out­pa­tients. Critical access hos­pi­tals, the small rural hos­pi­tals Medicare pays at cost, face no such percentage at all. Rural referral centers and sole com­mu­nity hos­pi­tals need 8%.3 Small urban and most rural hos­pi­tals have their adjust­ment capped at 12%, so for them the line sits just under the ceiling of the scale.15

Child sites qualify through the parent’s cost report

Once the parent hos­pital passes, its out­pa­tient sites follow by an accounting test. HRSA asks whether an off-site clinic is listed as reim­bursable on the hospital’s latest Medicare cost report, with out­pa­tient costs and charges of its own.18 A clinic that meets the test reg­is­ters as a child site. HRSA’s test does not ask whom the site serves.

A hearing record shows the sequence at one hos­pital. Northside Hospital’s director of finance told a House sub­com­mittee in October 2017 that the hospital’s talks to acquire oncology prac­tices began in 2011 and were com­pleted in 2012.17 The loca­tions oper­ating as hos­pital out­pa­tient depart­ments were child sites, she said, reg­is­tered in April 2014. Her expla­na­tion was that a large oncology prac­tice had approached Northside “seeking inte­gra­tion with the hos­pital system, as were several other hos­pital systems in the Atlanta area,” for “clin­i­cally-inte­grated care”.17 Asked whether patients had been denied care since, she answered, “Since we acquired them, no”.17 The record estab­lishes a sequence: acqui­si­tion, out­pa­tient-depart­ment oper­a­tion, reg­is­tra­tion, and hos­pital billing. It does not show why the hos­pital acquired the prac­tices beyond its stated reason, whether any patient’s bill changed, or what the clin­ical effect was.

Nor does the program ask about the patient’s means. HRSA’s answer to whether patients outside Medicaid can receive 340B drugs is “Yes, as long as they are patients of the covered entity”.19 So a patient’s com­mer­cial insur­ance or rel­a­tively high income does not by itself dis­qualify the pre­scrip­tion. The limit is the care rela­tion­ship. HRSA’s 1996 def­i­ni­tion excludes a person “if the only health care service received by the indi­vidual from the covered entity is the dis­pensing of a drug or drugs”.20

Contract phar­ma­cies widened the reach further. A con­tract phar­macy is an outside phar­macy that dis­penses on a covered entity’s behalf. In 2010 HRSA allowed each entity an unlim­ited number of con­tract phar­ma­cies, where its earlier guid­ance had allowed one.21 They grew from about 1,300 that year to nearly 20,000 in 2017.21

The phar­macy need not keep a sep­a­rate shelf. In the common arrange­ment it fills the pre­scrip­tion from its ordi­nary stock at the ordi­nary price. Software later combs the filled pre­scrip­tions and patient records for eli­gible ones, and the entity orders 340B-priced drugs to replenish the stock.22 That descrip­tion comes from a 2026 federal court order that relied on a drug maker’s declaration.

So the program’s growth is not the same as more medical treat­ment. CBO found that pur­chases through the program’s prime vendor rose from $6.6 billion in 2010 to $43.9 billion in 2021, in 2021 dollars. It judged the inte­gra­tion of hos­pi­tals with off-site clinics the largest of three program-spe­cific causes, and it could not put numbers on them.10 In 2021, 87% of that spending was on drugs admin­is­tered or dis­trib­uted in hos­pital out­pa­tient depart­ments and their off-site clinics.10 A trade-press account of CBO’s figures puts off-site clinics in the program at about 6,100 in 2013 and 27,700 in 2021.23 An existing treat­ment can enter the 340B accounts when own­er­ship, site reg­is­tra­tion, or pre­scrip­tion attribution changes.

One study of that growth comes with dis­clo­sures worth reading. A 2025 anal­ysis covered more than 28,000 drug codes. It attrib­uted an average of 79.6% of 2018–2024 growth at list prices to uti­liza­tion, meaning more units, and close to all of it at 340B prices.24 The National Pharmaceutical Council, which describes itself as sup­ported by leading bio­phar­ma­ceu­tical com­pa­nies, partly sup­ported the study and reviewed the man­u­script. IQVIA, which employs two of the three authors and owns the data, kept the final say on the text, and the data are not public.24,25 One of the three authors dis­closed that he was an independent director of Kalderos, which, the dis­clo­sure says, “offers 340B solutions”.24

The appoint­ment itself can carry the value, and some com­pa­nies say so in their mar­keting. In 2021 the con­sul­tant Advis pitched hos­pi­tals a med­i­ca­tion-man­age­ment clinic, to which affil­i­ated physi­cian offices refer patients for a qual­i­fying visit. The clinic, Advis wrote, could add “340B pre­scrip­tion revenue from patients that wouldn’t oth­er­wise qualify for the Program”.26 Another company, CPS, markets “referral capture” to “retain escaping patients”.27 Both describe prac­tice that the statute allows, as a federal court read it. That court struck down HRSA’s nar­rower patient def­i­ni­tion as “con­trary to the plain lan­guage” of the law.28

The hos­pital does not need the patient to become poorer, the medicine to become more effec­tive, or the man­u­fac­turer to lower its ordi­nary price for the oppor­tu­nity to change. An extra appoint­ment might uncover an inter­ac­tion, improve adher­ence, or coor­di­nate care. It might also impose travel, time away from work, and another bill. Calling every qual­i­fying visit a sham is unsup­ported. Treating a qual­i­fying visit as evi­dence of clin­ical value is equally unsupported.

Payment rules decide where the margin is made

The spread on a pre­scrip­tion depends on who pays for it, and federal rules decide much of that.

Medicaid’s fee-for-service program, in which the state pays the claim itself, pays close to cost. Federal guid­ance since 2016 has told states to pay phar­ma­cies their actual acqui­si­tion cost plus a dis­pensing fee. For 340B drugs, it says, “reim­burse­ment should not exceed the 340B ceiling price”.29 On a Medicaid fee-for-service pre­scrip­tion the spread is close to nothing, by rule.

HRSA also keeps those patients out of con­tract phar­ma­cies by default. A drug maker must not pay twice on one unit, once as a 340B dis­count and again as a Medicaid rebate. To prevent it, HRSA bars 340B drugs for Medicaid fee-for-service patients at con­tract phar­ma­cies unless the phar­macy, the entity and the state agree on a method.30,31 The inspector general found in 2014 that most enti­ties it studied, a pur­po­sive sample of 30, did not dis­pense 340B drugs to Medicaid patients there.32

Both rules are written for fee-for-service. Medicaid managed care, in which a private plan pays the claim, falls outside them, so Medicaid is not absent from the spread. An unin­sured patient pays what she can, which is often little. In GAO’s sample of 55 enti­ties, 30 reported giving low-income unin­sured patients a dis­count at some or all of their contract pharmacies.21

So the gate does not measure the out­pa­tient pop­u­la­tion on which the finan­cial oppor­tu­nity depends, and the payment rules pull the two apart. Medicaid’s fee-for-service program pays close to the 340B price by rule, and its patients are kept out of con­tract phar­ma­cies by default. The patients the gate counts most, Medicaid patients, there­fore produce less of the margin. MedPAC writes that the formula “is pri­marily driven by Medicaid patient shares”.33 The same person can still stand on both sides. A patient in a Medicaid managed-care plan counts toward the gate when she is admitted and can produce a spread when she fills a prescription.

Minnesota has pub­lished 340B revenue by payer. Its health depart­ment esti­mates that in 2024 com­mer­cial insurers pro­duced about 45% of covered entities’ net 340B revenue, and Medicare about 36%. The state’s public pro­grams, Medical Assistance and MinnesotaCare, pro­duced about 19%.34 The figures are esti­mated, self-reported and unau­dited, and they leave out self-pay and unin­sured patients. They are also a share of revenue, a dif­ferent kind of number from the gate’s index of days. They are set beside the index only to show direc­tion. Maine now requires 340B hos­pi­tals to report by payer type as well, begin­ning July 1, 2026. Washington requires it where the data are avail­able, under a law in force since June 11, 2026.35,36 Neither state’s payer figures are used here.

A study of cancer drugs shows the same depen­dence on the payer. Among Blue Cross Blue Shield patients at 1,541 hos­pi­tals from 2020 to 2024, the esti­mated prices hos­pi­tals paid for three biosim­i­lars fell by 60%, 72% and 63%. What insurers paid fell by 32%, 36% and 34%.37 The gap between them, which the authors call the markup margin, grew as the drugs got cheaper. The acqui­si­tion prices were esti­mated from Medicare’s price files and never observed. The study’s funder is a foun­da­tion whose board includes rep­re­sen­ta­tives of Blue Cross plans, the payers of the markups it mea­sures.37,38 The nar­rower lesson is valu­able: lower-priced treat­ment and higher provider margin can occur together if acqui­si­tion prices fall faster than reimbursement.

This is also why “man­u­fac­turer-funded” does not mean “without con­se­quences for tax­payers.” The man­dated acqui­si­tion dis­count comes from the man­u­fac­turer. The reim­burse­ment that turns it into a margin can come from Medicare, an employer-spon­sored plan, and the patient.

11.75% was chosen to qualify particular hospitals

The line has a recorded origin, set out in the same 2026 history.9 One staffer recalled low­ering it to 12.5% so the University of Virginia’s hos­pital would qualify. Senator Hatch’s con­di­tion was that the University of Utah’s hos­pital qualify too. So, “to accom­mo­date Senator Hatch,” staff “found the new nec­es­sary minimum eli­gi­bility cri­te­rion: 11.75%”.9 The change added 91 hos­pi­tals and appeared only in the enrolled bill.9 That account rests on papers and mem­o­ries from 1992. It shows how the number was chosen, not whether it is a good one.

Medicare has since moved its own money off this measure. MedPAC reported in 2015, citing its 2007 report, that the formula’s pay­ments tracked uncom­pen­sated care poorly. The hos­pi­tals in the top tenth by uncom­pen­sated care pro­vided 41% of it and received 10% of the pay­ments.16 Since the Affordable Care Act, 75% of what Medicare would have paid in dis­pro­por­tionate share money goes into a sep­a­rate pool for uncom­pen­sated care, reduced as the unin­sured rate falls.14 MedPAC then designed a replace­ment index for Medicare’s own pay­ments, and voted in 2023 to recommend it.33,39 The index has three parts. One is the share of a hospital’s Medicare claims, inpa­tient and out­pa­tient, that are for low-income ben­e­fi­cia­ries. The others are its uncom­pen­sated care as a share of revenue and, at half weight, Medicare’s share of its inpa­tient days.33 Its exec­u­tive director said of 340B, by a trade publication’s account, “We are not touching it”.39 So Medicare now pays only a quarter of its dis­pro­por­tionate share money on the old index, while 340B still uses it for the whole deci­sion, on $79.2 billion of pur­chases in 2025.

Hospitals near the line changed

The best evi­dence com­pares hos­pi­tals just above and just below 11.75%. Desai and McWilliams did so in Medicare claims. Eligibility was asso­ci­ated with 2.3 more hema­tol­o­gist-oncol­o­gists prac­ticing in hos­pital-owned facil­i­ties, 230% more than expected.40 It was also asso­ci­ated with lower pro­por­tions of low-income patients in hema­tology-oncology, and with no more safety-net care.40 The design describes hos­pi­tals near the line, not every 340B hos­pital. The AHA replied that such hos­pi­tals are a “sliver” of the program and that the study used tra­di­tional Medicare data only.41

Hospitals also cluster at the line. In 2014–2016 the number of hos­pi­tals just above 11.75% rose 41% rel­a­tive to those just below. Investor-owned hos­pi­tals, which cannot use the program, showed no such change.42 The authors list better record keeping, admit­ting more Medicaid patients and mis­re­porting as pos­sible causes. They put the share of hos­pi­tals that adjusted at “at most roughly 8%”.42

A 2026 study fol­lowed 122 hos­pi­tals that joined 340B in 2019 against 779 that did not, in tra­di­tional Medicare claims. Joining was fol­lowed by more total claims and more drug-admin­is­tra­tion claims at newly opened off-campus depart­ments. The rise in drug claims them­selves was not sta­tis­ti­cally sig­nif­i­cant, and the volumes were small.43

Several studies look at where new sites reg­ister. Clinics reg­is­tered in 2004 or later served com­mu­ni­ties that were wealthier and better insured than those served by earlier reg­is­trants.44 Between 2010 and 2022 the neigh­bor­hoods of newly reg­is­tered child sites and con­tract phar­ma­cies became less deprived, while those of newly reg­is­tered hos­pi­tals did not change.45 Another study, funded by Johnson & Johnson, found that child sites’ ZIP-code areas had a median income 28% above their parents’.46 These are studies of where new sites reg­ister, by neigh­bor­hood, not of whom they treat. The hospitals’ asso­ci­a­tion replied to the first that its authors had not checked whether the clinics opened before or after their hospitals joined.47

None of the studies cited here com­pares a parent hospital’s patients with its own child sites’ patients. What exists is one doc­u­mented hos­pital and neighborhood data.

Who benefits along the entire pipeline

Where the whole spread can be counted, the hos­pi­tals and clinics keep most of it. In Minnesota they reported $3.04 billion in pay­ments for 340B drugs in 2024 and $1.53 billion to acquire them, a spread of $1.51 billion.34 They reported about $165 million in oper­ating costs. About $137 million of that went to outside firms, $120 million to con­tract phar­ma­cies and $17 million to other outside parties such as admin­is­tra­tors, which is about 9% of the spread. The other $28 million or so was the entities’ own internal cost.34 They kept at least $1.34 billion in net 340B revenue, and large hos­pi­tals accounted for more than 80% of it.34 These are amounts the enti­ties reported paying, so they are not a full measure of what inter­me­di­aries earn. The figures are self-reported and unau­dited. The state calls the reim­burse­ments for admin­is­tered drugs likely inac­cu­rate and the reporting of internal costs incon­sis­tent, and it does not track how the net revenue was spent.34

Drugs bought $1.53BAt least $1.34BSpread $1.51BNet, kept by covered entitiesOperating costs, about $165M0123.04Paid for 340B drugs, $ billions. Self-reported, unaudited
Figure 4What Minnesota’s covered entities reported for 340B drugs in 2024. Of $3.04 billion paid, $1.53 billion bought the drugs and about $165 million went to operating costs, about $137 million of it paid to contract pharmacies and other outside firms. At least $1.34 billion stayed as net revenue, about 89% of the $1.51 billion spread. Self-reported and unaudited; Minnesota Department of Health, report of February 2026 on 2024 data.

Under current law a hos­pital may spend that money as it chooses. Cleveland Clinic told the com­mittee that “there is no dollar-for-dollar ‘pass on’ require­ment to patients under the 340B statute,” which is a correct state­ment of the law.2 Its 340B benefit was $933.7 million from April 2020 to June 2023. Of the $395.4 million in savings on physi­cian-admin­is­tered drugs, 44% came from phar­ma­cies it owns at its child sites.2 It told the com­mittee that the money reaches its income state­ment “without being independently seg­re­gated, dis­trib­uted or allo­cated”.2 The 2025 staff report found that its finan­cial-assis­tance policy did not cover dis­pensed drugs. Cleveland Clinic says it pro­vides “exten­sive phar­macy-related ben­e­fits at minimal to no addi­tional cost to patients or payers”.2 Bon Secours told the com­mittee that “revenue is revenue, and all revenue is used to pay for expenses incurred in pursuit of our mission”.2

Between the drug maker and the hos­pital sits a layer of com­pa­nies paid on each 340B trans­ac­tion. A whole­saler settles the dis­count. A prime vendor col­lects a fee from sup­pliers on pur­chases under its con­tract. An admin­is­trator matches a pre­scrip­tion to a patient, and a phar­macy dis­penses it.2,48,49 They supply real ser­vices: dis­pensing, patient coun­seling, inven­tory, claims matching, and com­pli­ance support. Few of them publish what 340B earns them.

Apexus has been the sole 340B prime vendor since 2004, under an HRSA con­tract. About nine in ten covered enti­ties buy through it, by Senator Cassidy’s account.50 The gov­ern­ment does not pay it. Drug makers and dis­trib­u­tors pay Apexus a small percentage of sales, the New York Times reported.49 Senator Cassidy’s letter says the company gen­er­ated $227 million in 2022.50 The Times, which the letter cites, reported that Apexus was on track for that figure.49 The company is private and its accounts are not public.49 Apexus says the program “is managed by” HRSA, “not by Apexus,” and that it “has no role in setting drug prices for patients or reim­burse­ment for covered enti­ties”.51 An inquiry iden­ti­fies ques­tions to inves­ti­gate, not established wrongdoing.

Three whole­salers handle nearly all drug dis­tri­bu­tion, by PhRMA’s count, and in a 340B sale the whole­saler settles the dis­count by charging the dif­fer­ence back to the man­u­fac­turer.48 PhRMA, the drug makers’ trade group, con­cedes the larger point in its own report. “While the covered entity retains the largest share of the revenue, the whole­saler and the phar­macy also benefit finan­cially from the 340B trans­ac­tion,” it says.48 Cencora tells its investors that a rebate model “may also sup­plant 340B charge­back mech­a­nisms that we admin­ister, which could adversely affect our busi­ness”.52 McKesson owns Macro Helix, which by McKesson’s account serves about 40% of 340B hos­pi­tals.53 In 2025 McKesson also bought control of the busi­ness-ser­vices company of Florida Cancer Specialists, a prac­tice that “remains independently owned”.54

Five com­pa­nies, CVS, Walgreens, Express Scripts, OptumRx and Walmart, held three-quar­ters of 340B con­tract-phar­macy rela­tion­ships, according to the Senate staff report, citing Drug Channels.2 CVS required hos­pi­tals and clinics to use its own admin­is­trator, Wellpartner, for the 340B drugs dis­pensed at CVS phar­ma­cies. It told the com­mittee that this “inte­grated approach” reduces “com­pli­ance prob­lems,” and that hos­pi­tals remain free to use other phar­ma­cies and admin­is­tra­tors.2 In the con­tracts the com­mittee exam­ined, Wellpartner’s fee was the greater of $4 or 10% of the spread, rising to 14% in later con­tract years.2 A fee of that kind rises with the spread, which is what is paid for the drug, by insurer and patient together, less the 340B price. It does not follow the drug’s price as such.

By CVS’s own count, Wellpartner’s fees were $147 million in 2019, peaked at $386 million in 2021 and were $382 million in 2023, $1.6 billion over five years.2 That is revenue, not profit. CVS’s phar­ma­cies also earn a dis­pensing fee, which CVS says com­pen­sates them for for­going “pay­ments from insurers”.2 CVS tells its share­holders that the arrange­ment matters to it. Fewer con­tract-phar­macy arrange­ments, less use of its admin­is­tra­tive ser­vices, or less par­tic­i­pa­tion by drug makers, it writes, “could mate­ri­ally and adversely affect the Company”.55 Walgreens charged admin­is­tra­tive fees of 8%, 13% and 20% in con­tracts the com­mittee exam­ined, on top of the dis­pensing fee, and did not report what its admin­is­trator earns.2 Walgreens says hos­pi­tals need not use its admin­is­trator and that its fees are fair market value.2 The committee’s report is the work of one party’s staff, and it is not an adjudicated finding.

A pub­licly filed con­tract shows how a percentage fee behaves. A 2021 agree­ment between a Florida AIDS service orga­ni­za­tion and a spe­cialty phar­macy sets the pharmacy’s fee on insured claims at $17 plus 12% of total reim­burse­ment.56 Applying that formula to a hypo­thet­ical $1,000 reim­burse­ment pro­duces $137 in phar­macy com­pen­sa­tion. If acqui­si­tion cost were $600, the spread would be $400, and $263 would remain before admin­is­trator fees and other entity costs. Wellpartner’s formula, from a dif­ferent arrange­ment, would take $40 of the same $400 spread in a first con­tract year and $56 at its later rate of 14%. The $1,000 and $600 are illus­tra­tive, and the fee for­mulas are doc­u­mented. These are one his­tor­ical con­tract and one company’s terms, not a national average or a finding of overcharging.

0$50$100$1500$500$1,000Payment for the drug0$50$100$1500$200$400Spread on the drug$137 on $1,000$40 on $400From $17A filed pharmacy contract:fee of $17 + 12% of paymentCVS’s administrator, year one:10% of spread, at least $4Two different arrangements, drawn to the same scales
Figure 5Two documented fee formulas from different arrangements, each drawn against the amount it is charged on. A filed pharmacy contract’s fee reaches $137 on a $1,000 payment, and CVS’s administrator fee reaches $40 on a $400 spread at its first-year rate. Each grows with its own base, the payment for the first and the spread for the second. Example amounts; formulas from an SEC-filed contract and the Senate staff report.

Some of these com­pa­nies belong to larger groups. The three largest phar­macy benefit man­agers, PBMs, are ver­ti­cally inte­grated with large insurers, the Federal Trade Commission’s staff found.57 Their groups also own phar­ma­cies that act as 340B con­tract phar­ma­cies, and two of them, CVS and Cigna, own admin­is­tra­tors that match the claims.2,58 So one parent company can pay for a 340B pre­scrip­tion through its insurer or PBM, earn a fee on it at its phar­macy, and earn another as the admin­is­trator. Whether any group does is not shown. CVS told the com­mittee that it keeps fire­walls between its admin­is­trator, its PBM and its insurer.2 A gain in the phar­macy sub­sidiary is not auto­mat­i­cally a saving for the employer, and nothing here shows what any group nets.

None of these sources has any of these com­pa­nies directing the program. They draw less atten­tion than hos­pi­tals and drug makers, and they say less about 340B in public. The legal recip­ient of the dis­count and the eco­nomic recip­ient of its value are not nec­es­sarily the same. Services, fees, nego­ti­ated prices, and own­er­ship deter­mine how that value is divided.

The lobbying is a fight over specific financial rights

The public record shows orga­nized cam­paigns over the dis­count, the patient def­i­ni­tion, con­tract phar­ma­cies, and infor­ma­tion. It does not reveal every meeting, estab­lish that a senator adopted a posi­tion in exchange for money, or allo­cate every lob­bying dollar to 340B.

Lobbying dis­clo­sure sup­plies scale, with an impor­tant lim­i­ta­tion. PhRMA reported $7.04 million in federal lob­bying for the third quarter of 2026, across every issue it works on. Its filing lists the SUSTAIN, ACCESS and SECURE bills and Senator Cassidy’s draft among them.59 For the same quarter the AHA reported $3.84 million across all issues, and 340B Health, the asso­ci­a­tion of par­tic­i­pating hos­pi­tals, reported $330,000 across all issues.60,61 None of these totals mea­sures spending on 340B.

The hos­pi­tals ask to keep the gate where it is. The AHA’s letter went to Senator Bill Cassidy, the Louisiana Republican who chairs the Senate health com­mittee. A site should qualify, the AHA wrote, if it “is part of the 340B hos­pital.” It should also meet Medicare’s provider-based stan­dards and furnish “mean­ingful out­pa­tient ser­vices to the hospital’s patients”.62 In October the AHA asked the spon­sors of the SUSTAIN bill to “Remove Child Site Restrictions,” including a three-year wait for newly acquired sites.63

On patients, the AHA’s answer to Senator Cassidy’s draft was direct. It “respect­fully reject[s] the premise that the current struc­ture of the 340B program does not ensure direct patient benefit”.62 Every dollar saved, it wrote, ben­e­fits patients, either by “directly defraying the high cost of pre­scrip­tions” or by “sup­porting crit­ical patient care ser­vices”.62 The draft would let a hos­pital keep upfront dis­counts only if it passed the full value of every dis­count to patients. It would also require a fed­er­ally set sliding fee scale, with a cap of $0 for patients below the poverty line.62,64 The AHA’s reply begins, “While the AHA sup­ports efforts to help patients afford their med­i­ca­tions,” and goes on that this approach “over­looks the purpose and struc­ture of the 340B program”.62 The SUSTAIN bill, which the AHA sup­ports, would instead apply each hospital’s finan­cial-assis­tance policy at its child sites.65

The hos­pi­tals also ask Congress to bar “dis­crim­i­na­tory prac­tices by health plans and phar­macy benefit man­agers”.63 That is a fight over who keeps the spread. If a plan pays less for a 340B pre­scrip­tion, part of the spread moves from the hos­pital to the payer. Which outcome is prefer­able depends on what the retained money finances and whether the purchaser’s savings reach patients or plan sponsors.

Drug makers ask for fewer dis­counted units and more infor­ma­tion. Manufacturers pay the dis­count, and the statute lets them audit a covered entity’s use of it.3 Their pre­ferred fixes, rebates and a nar­rower patient def­i­ni­tion, would reduce the number of units sold at the ceiling price. The money from those units would stay with the man­u­fac­turer. It would lower what a patient pays only if a second rule said so. The same holds for any pro­posal that narrows the program, including the candidate below.

Since 2020 drug makers have limited 340B sales through con­tract phar­ma­cies, and two federal appeals courts have held that the statute allows it. “Nowhere does Section 340B mention con­tract phar­ma­cies,” one wrote.28 A valid concern about dupli­cate dis­counts should not be dis­missed because the man­u­fac­turer ben­e­fits. But man­u­fac­turer revenue restored by a restric­tion is not auto­mat­i­cally a saving for a patient or insurer.

Their current vehicle is a rebate. Under an upfront dis­count, the entity needs less cash when it acquires the drug. Under a rebate model, it first pays more and later submits infor­ma­tion to recover the dif­fer­ence. HRSA’s revised pilot is scheduled to start on January 1, 2027, for the drugs chosen for Medicare’s price nego­ti­a­tion.66 A covered entity buys at the list price and claims a rebate equal to that price minus the ceiling price. The man­u­fac­turer must pay or deny with doc­u­men­ta­tion within 10 days of a com­plete sub­mis­sion, and may not deny over its own concern about diver­sion or dupli­cate dis­counts.66 Paying $1,000 now and receiving $400 later requires $400 more working capital than paying $600 upfront. A first version of the pilot was enjoined in December 2025 and vacated in February 2026.67 The AHA, the Maine Hospital Association and four hos­pi­tals chal­lenged the revised version on October 9, 2026.68 The court set oral argu­ment for November 18, and as of November 14, 2026, no ruling had been issued.69

HRSA audits hos­pi­tals and clinics, and it audits drug makers. It posted results for 176 audits of hos­pi­tals and clinics for fiscal 2025.70 In HRSA’s pub­lished table, 34 list a finding of diver­sion, meaning a 340B drug went to someone who was not the entity’s patient, and 78 list no adverse finding.70 A diver­sion finding requires repay­ment to the man­u­fac­turer, and it is not a finding of fraud. HRSA chooses most of the enti­ties it audits at random from groups it judges riskier, by pur­chase volume and the use of con­tract phar­ma­cies among other things. It targets the rest on alle­ga­tions.21,71 GAO reported in 2018 that the split was about 90% and 10%.21 So these counts describe a sample chosen for risk, not a national rate. The audited hos­pi­tals are not named here, because the 34 range from large systems to rural clinics, and picking a few would accuse them of more than the audits found. HRSA also posted results for five man­u­fac­turer audits in each of fiscal 2024, 2025 and 2026.72 Several found that the company had “charged more than the 340B ceiling price” and ordered it to repay covered enti­ties. The com­pa­nies named are mostly generic makers.72

One court case is unre­solved. In March 2026 a federal appeals court revived a hos­pital system’s False Claims Act suit against AbbVie, AstraZeneca, Novartis, Sanofi and affil­i­ates, holding only that its claims were ade­quately pleaded.73 The suit alleges ceiling-price over­charges. No court has found the companies liable.

The Community Oncology Alliance, COA, speaks for independent oncology prac­tices. COA asks Congress to “Base hos­pital eli­gi­bility on mean­ingful, auditable out­pa­tient safety-net per­for­mance”.74 COA says it “is not asking Congress to extend 340B eli­gi­bility to independent com­mu­nity oncology prac­tices”.74 It is a member of AIR340B, a coali­tion that also lists PhRMA and several drug makers, and its members compete with hos­pi­tals for the same infu­sion patients.75 COA’s pro­posal is close to mine, and COA has an interest in it. I have one too. I work in hos­pital oncology, in a system that takes part in 340B, and the change argued here could apply to its hospitals.

HRSA can count and audit, but only Congress can change the gate. GAO exam­ined 258 non­govern­mental hos­pi­tals that HRSA reviewed in 2017 and 2018. Of them, 18 sent doc­u­ments that “did not appear to be con­tracts”.76 Another 13 sent con­tracts that did not appear to require serving the low-income pop­u­la­tion, and all were allowed to stay in the program.76 GAO told HRSA in 2020 that it does not require hos­pi­tals to repay dupli­cate dis­counts in Medicaid managed care. The health depart­ment dis­agreed with two of GAO’s three recommenda­tions, and as of March 2026 all three remained open.77 Courts have limited HRSA from both sides. One struck down its narrow patient def­i­ni­tion, two held that drug makers may restrict con­tract-phar­macy sales, and one enjoined its first rebate pilot.28,67

No bill before Congress changes the count of inpa­tient days by which a hos­pital qual­i­fies. The SUSTAIN 340B Act, S. 5244, was intro­duced in August 2026 by Jerry Moran, Republican of Kansas.65 Its cospon­sors are Senators Tammy Baldwin of Wisconsin, Shelley Moore Capito of West Virginia, Tim Kaine of Virginia, John Boozman of Arkansas and John Hickenlooper of Colorado. Three are Democrats and two are Republicans. The bill pro­tects upfront dis­counts and con­tract phar­ma­cies and would end the rebate pilot. It adds a three-year wait for newly acquired sites, applies the hospital’s finan­cial-assis­tance policy at child sites and requires reporting by payer.65 It sets no test of whom a child site serves.

Senator Cassidy released a dis­cus­sion draft in June 2026.78 It lets man­u­fac­turers choose among upfront dis­counts, dis­counts after claims data, and rebates. It adds need tests for child sites and caps what patients pay, but it does not change how a hos­pital qual­i­fies.64,78 The SECURE 340B Act, H.R. 9599, comes closest. For private non­profit hos­pi­tals it would tighten the gov­ern­ment-con­tract test, the gap GAO found, and require yearly ver­i­fi­ca­tion of non­profit status.79 It is also the one bill that puts a patient test into statu­tory lan­guage. A child site would qualify if it lies in a socially vul­ner­able ZIP-code area. Failing that, it would qualify if “not less than 40 percent of patients served” are on Medicaid, unin­sured or at or below 200% of the poverty line.79 The 11.75% line stays where it is. Senator Cassidy’s draft and the SECURE bill would both bar administrators’ fees tied to the price of the drug. The draft requires flat amounts, and the bill bars fees set as a share of revenue or volume.64,79

All three are pro­posals, and a dis­cus­sion draft is not enacted law. Medicare’s 2027 payment rule is final, and it pays for 340B drugs at the average sales price minus 28%.80 It changes what Medicare pays and leaves eligibility alone.

Measure the clinics first

The first step does not depend on anyone’s pre­ferred reform. Congress should require each 340B hos­pital to report whom its out­pa­tient sites and phar­macy chan­nels serve and what the dis­count earns there, on one set of def­i­ni­tions. Hospitals would report by site and payer for several years, which the SECURE and SUSTAIN bills already require in part, before any eli­gi­bility con­se­quence.65,79 New sites would get a grace period from opening. The premise of this essay has not been tested patient by patient, and the reporting is the test.

The data would be the hospital’s own audited claims, not state files. Hospitals should already be able to sort 340B claims by payer, since they bill insurers and must avoid dupli­cate dis­counts. The inspector general found in 2021 that most states’ payment data for Medicaid managed care were incom­plete or inaccurate.81

What Congress should then do with the numbers depends on what it wants the dis­count to pay for, and the debate runs several aims together. One is patient need, meaning how many poor patients a hos­pital and its sites treat. Another is uncom­pen­sated burden, the care a hos­pital gives and is not paid for. A third is the value of the dis­counted drugs that poor patients receive. These come apart. A psy­chi­atric unit or a labor ward that serves the poor carries need and burden and uses few costly drugs. An infu­sion center uses a great deal of dis­count whoever sits in its chairs.

The SECURE bill counts patients, as a fall­back. A child site whose ZIP code does not qualify can still pass if 40% of its patients are on Medicaid, unin­sured or poor.79 A count like that is easy to explain and to audit. Its weak­ness is that a site can pass on visits while most of its drug volume is commercial.

Medicare has gone the other way for its own money, toward uncom­pen­sated care. MedPAC’s index counts a hospital’s uncom­pen­sated care as a share of revenue, beside its low-income Medicare patients, inpa­tient and out­pa­tient.33 It was built to dis­tribute Medicare pay­ments. It is a prece­dent for mea­suring more than inpa­tient days, and it does not val­i­date any 340B formula, including the one below. The entry gate’s own arith­metic could be repaired in the same direc­tion, by counting unin­sured patients in the numer­ator and out­pa­tients beside inpa­tients. The sources would be the audited cost-report work­sheet that Medicare already uses for uncom­pen­sated care and the hospital’s own claims.

One candidate formula and its risks

The can­di­date below weighs the drugs them­selves. This is the design I would put forward. Every part of it is rea­soning from the evi­dence above, and none of it has been tested.

The test would count patients and pre­scrip­tions, never margin dollars. For each child site and each con­tract-phar­macy channel, count the 340B admin­is­tra­tions and fills that go to low-income patients. Those are patients on Medicaid, unin­sured, eli­gible for both Medicare and Medicaid, or receiving the hospital’s finan­cial assis­tance. Weight each by the dis­count it uses, the gap between the list price and the ceiling price.

The weighting matters, because a test weighted by margin would fail every hos­pital by con­struc­tion, since Medicaid fee-for-service pays near the ceiling price. Weighting by the dis­count counts low-income care in the unit of the subsidy the man­u­fac­turer gives, and it counts a Medicaid patient’s infu­sion the same as a com­mer­cial patient’s. It also uses sta­tuses a hos­pital already records, where a test of income would need data hos­pi­tals do not collect from insured patients.

The reach would scale at the level of the network, with no site tested alone. A network’s 340B volume at its out­pa­tient sites and phar­ma­cies could run up to a set mul­tiple of its low-income out­pa­tient volume. Above the mul­tiple, eli­gi­bility would taper and never stop at a cliff. This keeps the cross-subsidy, since com­mer­cial pre­scrip­tions still produce a spread, but only in pro­por­tion to the low-income drug volume behind it.

An example with invented numbers shows the taper. Call a network’s low-income volume, weighted by dis­count, one unit, and suppose the mul­tiple is 3. A network whose 340B volume is 2.5 units keeps all of it. Suppose that above 3 units each further unit keeps a falling share of the dis­count, from all of it at 3 to none at 6. A network at 5 units keeps the first 3 in full. On the next 2 it keeps two-thirds on average, the mid­point of 100% and 33%, or 1.33 units. It keeps 4.33 of its 5 units, about 87%. The mul­tiple is a policy choice, as arbi­trary as 11.75 unless evi­dence fixes it.

Illustration of a candidate rule, not dataVolume that keeps the discount, same unit012345601234567Example multiple: 3Today: all of itLevel from 6At 2.5:keeps allAt 5: keeps 4.33,about 87%Above 3, a falling share:all at 3, none at 6A network’s 340B volume, as a multiple ofits low-income outpatient volume
Figure 6A tapered rule, one candidate among several, with an example multiple of 3. A network’s 340B volume keeps the full discount up to three times its low-income outpatient volume, then a falling share. A network at five times keeps about 87% of the discount, and none faces a cliff. Example numbers drawn for this essay; the multiple and the slope are policy choices, and how the taper would be settled is not defined.

A gate at the clinics would wait on the reporting. If it shows that child sites serve people as needy as the parent’s, the gate is unnec­es­sary, and I would drop it.

The formula has its own per­verse incen­tives. None has been seen, because it has never been tried.

It favors expen­sive, deeply dis­counted drugs. A hos­pital that treats poor patients with costly infu­sions would earn more reach than one that gives them psy­chi­atric, emer­gency, obstetric or primary care with little drug spending. That second hos­pital may be doing more for the poor. Drug selec­tion and price changes would also move the allowance. A list price rises, or a phar­macy com­mittee switches prod­ucts, and a network’s reach changes while its patients are exactly as poor as before.

Counting only 340B admin­is­tra­tions and fills would under­count low-income patients whose drugs are kept out of 340B. Medicaid fee-for-service pre­scrip­tions at con­tract phar­ma­cies are the plain case, since HRSA bars them by default.30 A hos­pital could treat many such patients and get no credit for them.

A boundary drawn around a whole network could reward acqui­si­tions. A system could buy sites with enough qual­i­fying volume to carry more com­mer­cial expan­sion else­where, and a rule meant to limit growth would reward buying more sites.

The set­tle­ment is unde­fined, and it would have to be defined before anyone could vote on the rule. “Keeps the dis­count” could mean that the hos­pital keeps full dis­counts on chosen pre­scrip­tions. It could mean a smaller dis­count on every pre­scrip­tion, or a repay­ment of part of the savings after the year closes, or the loss of eli­gi­bility at chosen sites. Each lands dif­fer­ently on patients, on a hospital’s cash, on man­u­fac­turers and on the admin­is­tra­tors who would run it. Site loss also brings back the cliff, one site at a time. Until the unit, the boundary of a network, the treat­ment of excluded pre­scrip­tions and the set­tle­ment are defined, Figure 6 illus­trates an allo­ca­tion rule and is not a bill.

Whatever Congress chooses, rural hos­pi­tals would keep a path of their own. Critical access hos­pi­tals, sole com­mu­nity hos­pi­tals and rural referral centers would keep today’s eli­gi­bility, with reporting only and no new ratio. They already face no percentage test or a lower one, small volumes make ratios noisy, and a rural infu­sion chair serves whoever lives nearby. Joining 340B was asso­ci­ated with rural hos­pi­tals being 8.3 percentage points more likely to add oncology ser­vices.82 But crit­ical access hos­pi­tals in the most vul­ner­able areas are the least likely to take part at all, so a rural path does little for them.83

Any change to the gate would also be paired with a patient rule. A low-income patient’s cost-sharing for a 340B drug would be capped at every 340B site. A gate alone moves money to man­u­fac­turers. Senator Cassidy’s $0 cap below the poverty line and SUSTAIN’s exten­sion of finan­cial assis­tance are two proposed forms.64,65

None of these options decides how the money is spent, which is a sep­a­rate rule on the use of funds. Each adds mea­sure­ment cost, and part of that cost would be paid to the admin­is­tra­tors described above. Even audited spending allo­ca­tions would leave a second problem, because money is fun­gible. If an insti­tu­tion assigns $5 million of 340B con­tri­bu­tion to a clinic it already oper­ated, it can redi­rect $5 million pre­vi­ously bud­geted to that clinic. This is a hypo­thet­ical accounting example.

The strongest case against me

The strongest argu­ment is that the cross-subsidy is the design, and a gate at the clinics attacks the money where it is made. Commercial patients produce the spread. It pays for a parent hos­pital that serves the poor and often loses money. Richmond Community is the example, in its owner’s words, and the AHA says nearly 44% of 340B hos­pi­tals run neg­a­tive margins.2,5 A rule that asked every money-making site to serve mostly poor patients would be bound to shrink the spread, and it could close the hos­pi­tals the program keeps open.

Much of that is true. In places the cross-subsidy is the reason a hos­pital is open. But the argu­ment sets no limit. Under current law the reach has none, and no one can see whether the benefit keeps pace with it. For a hos­pital whose network really does pay for care of the poor, mea­suring costs only the reporting, and it lets the hos­pital prove its case. A tapered rule, if Congress chose one, would still let a network earn on insured patients. It would tie how far that goes to the low-income out­pa­tients the network treats.

Evidence favor­able to the safety-net ratio­nale deserves equal speci­ficity. Newly par­tic­i­pating public hos­pi­tals increased their offering of ser­vices that lose money, a change not seen broadly among non­profit hos­pi­tals, whose one sig­nif­i­cant increase was in oncology.84 Health centers that reg­is­tered more 340B loca­tions saw about 0.4% more unin­sured and low-income patients for each added loca­tion, in a descrip­tive study.85 All 29 covered enti­ties GAO inter­viewed in 2011 said the program helped them main­tain ser­vices and lower drug costs for patients, in a sample GAO called not gen­er­al­iz­able.86 Near the cutoff, eli­gi­bility was asso­ci­ated with com­mer­cial unit prices 25% lower, con­cen­trated in com­pet­i­tive markets, in claims from 2012 to 2014.87

The find­ings on charity care divide. One study found a 28.9% increase in charity care after hos­pi­tals joined, and its authors con­cluded that the increases “appear to be fully offset by reduc­tions in other com­mu­nity benefit pro­grams”.88 Another found no evi­dence that uncom­pen­sated care rose after entry.89 A third asso­ci­ated new par­tic­i­pa­tion with about $4,075 more spending per episode of five cancer bio­logics among com­mer­cially insured patients. Its new entrants were mostly small and rural hos­pi­tals, and earlier par­tic­i­pants were less likely to show the increase.90

A scoping review of 44 studies found the same split. Its highest-quality evi­dence indi­cates that non­profit dis­pro­por­tionate share hos­pi­tals “may be using the 340B program in margin-moti­vated ways”.91 That finding “is not con­sis­tent across other hos­pital types and public health clinics”.91 So the crit­ical evi­dence is strongest for non­profit dis­pro­por­tionate share hos­pi­tals, and a new gate would bind them first. It is pos­sible for all these find­ings to be true. A public hos­pital keeps more money-losing ser­vices, such as psy­chi­atric care, a health center expands HIV testing, a hos­pital system acquires a prof­itable infu­sion prac­tice, and a phar­macy inter­me­diary earns more fees.

A new ratio costs money to compute, creates a line of its own, and invites behavior no one has studied. Washington State’s hos­pi­tals warned that a site test “incen­tivizes con­sol­i­da­tion back to the main hos­pital campus”.92 The AHA allows that payer-mix mea­sures “may provide useful context” and objects to them as “rigid eli­gi­bility con­di­tions”.93 The current gate is volatile too, by the hospitals’ own account. The AHA warned in 2021 that pan­demic changes in payer mix threat­ened some hospitals’ eli­gi­bility.94 A finance asso­ci­a­tion reports that roughly 425 hos­pi­tals could lose it on their next cost report.95 The rural hospitals’ asso­ci­a­tion calls 340B savings “an essen­tial source of finan­cial sta­bility” and counts 417 rural hos­pi­tals as vul­ner­able to closure.96

A gate alone also helps no patient. Fewer qual­i­fying units leave more money with man­u­fac­turers. Infusion volume could return to independent prac­tices, including those in net­works that McKesson serves or that Cencora has con­trolled since February 2, 2026.54,97 Those are the parties that gain from a nar­rower gate, along­side COA’s members.

The timing is bad, too. In 2027 the same hos­pi­tals meet Medicare’s lower payment for 340B drugs and a faster repay­ment of earlier years, which the companion essay works through.80 A nar­rower gate would land on top of both.

Check

Two tests are pos­sible here, and passing one proves nothing about the other.

The first is whether the out­pa­tient expan­sion serves a dif­ferent pop­u­la­tion. Take each 340B hospital’s own claims and compute the low-income share of patients at every child site and con­tract-phar­macy channel. Compare it with the low-income share of the parent’s own inpa­tients and of the out­pa­tients on its main campus, counted the same way. If the child sites’ share matches the parent’s, the mis­match described here belongs to Richmond and a few places like it, and it has been overstated.

The second is whether the added money sus­tains added afford­able care. A com­par­ison of patients cannot settle that. A child site full of insured patients could be paying for a great deal of charity care, and one whose patients are as poor as the parent’s could be paying for none. This test needs net 340B revenue by site, set against the free and dis­counted care and the money-losing ser­vices that would shrink without it. Because money is fun­gible, a hospital’s own ledger will not do. The com­par­ison has to be with similar hos­pi­tals that lack the revenue, or with the same hos­pital before it arrived. If care for the poor grows in step with out­pa­tient 340B revenue, the cross-subsidy is working, and it matters much less that the inpa­tient gate cannot see outpatients.

The data for both tests are in each hospital’s own claims and its records of finan­cial assis­tance, not yet in any public file. Minnesota’s 340B reports sum­ma­rize each parent entity, child sites included, rather than each site.34 Its all-payer claims data­base holds claims sent by insurers and admin­is­tra­tors, so it holds no data on care for the unin­sured and has only what self-insured employer plans choose to send.98 A payer is also a rough stand-in for a patient’s income.

Some of the evi­dence points the other way. One anal­ysis, spon­sored by 340B Health and reported sec­ond­hand, found that 22.8% of Medicare patients receiving cancer drugs at 340B dis­pro­por­tionate share hos­pi­tals in 2014 were dually eli­gible for Medicaid. The figure in physi­cian offices was 14.0%.99 It comes from an inter­ested party, and its method is not described. Still, it is patient-level and it favors hos­pi­tals. Public hos­pi­tals added money-losing ser­vices, prices were lower near the cutoff where markets were com­pet­i­tive, and the central case is a single hos­pital the committee’s majority staff exam­ined after press reports.

The public record doc­u­ments vio­la­tions found by audit, with repay­ment ordered, by hos­pi­tals and by drug makers. It also doc­u­ments arrange­ments that are lawful and that no rule requires anyone to explain.

The arith­metic can be checked. The gate counts inpa­tient days only, the day of an unin­sured patient who is not eli­gible for Medicaid lowers the score, and the spread is made in out­pa­tient set­tings. How far a parent’s patients differ from its child sites’ patients is less certain, because no study here mea­sures it hos­pital by hos­pital. I am least sure what hos­pi­tals near a new line would cut.

Two results would change my mind about the inpa­tient gate. One is patient-level data showing that child sites serve people as needy as the parent’s. The other is evi­dence that hos­pi­tals near a site test cut care for the poor instead of shed­ding affluent sites.

The evi­dence most likely to change my assess­ment is audited finan­cial infor­ma­tion paired with cred­ible evi­dence that the addi­tional resources pre­serve or expand afford­able care. My con­fi­dence is high that con­sis­tent def­i­ni­tions would improve inter­pre­ta­tion; it is lower that dis­clo­sure alone would change conduct.

Some things are missing. What any one hos­pital would gain or lose needs that hospital’s claims. The formula is not defined well enough to leg­is­late. Health centers and Ryan White clinics, whose rules differ, get little space. The central case rests on one party’s staff report, and the bills and the lawsuit may move after November 14, 2026.

The program’s orig­inal promise, to help scarce resources reach further, remains defen­sible. Its current finan­cial archi­tec­ture makes that promise dif­fi­cult to verify because eli­gi­bility, revenue gen­er­a­tion, and public benefit are mea­sured at dif­ferent points by dif­ferent orga­ni­za­tions. The ques­tion every par­tic­i­pant should answer is there­fore the same. After the drug is pur­chased, the patient is treated, the claim is paid, and the fees are col­lected, what addi­tional care did this arrange­ment make pos­sible, and for whom?

Disclosure

The opin­ions here are my own and reflect my point of view, not that of the insti­tu­tions I work for, and none of them has endorsed this essay. The facts come from the public sources cited, and any cor­rec­tion is dated under the title.

Sources

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  2. U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, majority staff report, April 2025. Congress Must Act to Bring Needed Reforms to the 340B Drug Pricing Program: Richmond Community Hospital and Cleveland Clinic figures and statements, Bon Secours’s letters in the appendix, CVS and Walgreens fees and responses, and the five largest contract-pharmacy companies. One party’s staff report, not an adjudicated finding. PDF ↑
  3. 42 U.S.C. § 256b: covered entities, the ceiling price, the 11.75 percent test, the other hospital routes, diversion, duplicate discounts and audits. law.cornell.edu ↑
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  92. Washington State Hospital Association, August 27, 2026. Comment letter on Senator Cassidy’s discussion draft. An interested party’s statement. PDF ↑
  93. American Hospital Association, September 23, 2026. Comments on the SECURE 340B Act. aha.org ↑
  94. American Hospital Association, September 2021. Fact sheet: 340B-related payer mix changes. PDF ↑
  95. Healthcare Financial Management Association, updated September 29, 2026. Continued 340B eligibility is at risk for hundreds of hospitals, citing rural-hospital association data. hfma.org ↑
  96. National Rural Health Association, August 28, 2026. Comment on the 340B reform discussion draft. An interested party’s statement. PDF ↑
  97. Cencora, Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2026. Acquisition of the majority of OneOncology, completed February 2, 2026. sec.gov ↑
  98. Minnesota House Research, August 2026. Minnesota All Payer Claims Database: sources of data; self-insured ERISA plans report voluntarily; and Minnesota Department of Health, About the MN APCD: no data on care for the uninsured. PDF, health.state.mn.us ↑
  99. 340B Informed, May 2017. 340B hospitals treat more low-income cancer patients than non-340B providers: a Dobson DaVanzo analysis for 340B Health, 2014 Medicare Part B data, reported secondhand. 340binformed.org ↑

Correspondenceigor@barani.org